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Abstract
In a laboratory setting, we explore strategic discrimination in principal-agent relationships,
which arises from mutually re-enforcing expectations of identity-contingent choices. Our experi-
mental design isolates the influence of the strategic environment from effects of other sources of
discrimination, including statistical differences between sub-populations and outright prejudice.
We find that, in a strategic setting, principals who reward agents based on outcomes more readily
attribute high performance to effort when they share the agent’s group identity. No such bias
exists either for principals whose reward decisions are outcome-independent or for principals in
a non-strategic environment. Agents in the strategic setting tend to anticipate higher demands
from out-group principals, and condition their effort choice on that expectation. Because they
under-appreciate this conditionality, principals tend to underestimate the effort from out-group
agents.
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Considerable evidence from increasingly sophisticated controlled studies set in Western liberal
democracies, including the U.S., suggests the persistence of discrimination.1 This evidence, fre-
quently obtained in the context of underlying principal-agent relationships, is buttressed by the
systematic average pay and promotion differentials across sexes and racial and ethnic groups.2
Yet, despite such aggregate-level evidence, discrimination is notoriously difficult to prove at the
individual-case level – owing, in part, to the sometimes subtle nature of discriminatory practices,
and in part, to the de-facto institutional discouragement of individual redress. Our aim in this
paper is to provide an experimental analysis of one critical source of discriminatory practices which
helps account for this disjunction: the strategic calculus of mutual expectations at the core of many
principal-agent relationships.
Consider the following example. Alice’s team supervisor, Bob, will decide which members
of the team to promote in order to encourage good performance. Bob does not directly observe
how much effort they put in and will base his judgment on his interpretation of their individual
performance outcomes – noisy measures of the effort levels underlying them. Alice, who is concerned
about the possibility that Bob’s decisions will favor team members who are like himself over those
who are like her is pessimistic about her chances for promotion and therefore considers whether it
might be wiser to re-allocate some of her time elsewhere, or to increase her effort in the hope of
impressing Bob. Bob, who suspects that Alice is choosing to under-invest, is less likely to attribute
a good outcome from her to her effort, and more likely to her good luck. In effect, then, the quality
of outcome Alice needs to generate to obtain a promotion is higher than the quality of outcome
needed for other similarly situated team members.
If, realizing this, Alice is discouraged and chooses to invest less, Bob’s suspicions are confirmed;
his interpretation of outcomes and Alice’s expectation of a tougher standard would be both correct
1These studies include audit studies (Bendick, 2007; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Goldin
and Rouse, 2000), “hit-rate” analyses (Knowles, Persico and Todd, 2001; Persico, 2002, 2009), and
experiments implementing behavioral games (Falk and Zehnder, 2007).
2See, e.g., Wright, Baxter and Birkelund (1995); Altonji and Blank (1999); Western and Pettit
(2005).
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and consistent with each other and with the actions supporting them. Yet, the state of affairs
would be clearly discriminatory, and arguably no less insidious in this case, where it is a result of
parties’ higher-order beliefs (i.e., beliefs about beliefs), than when discrimination is a response to
statistically or psychologically sustained asymmetric group-based generalizations. Of course, Alice
may, instead, choose to invest more, not less, effort, in which case Bob’s judgment would be both
discriminatory and incorrect.
Strategic discrimination as exemplified in Bob’s response to Alice in the above example need
not be identified with specific discriminatory institutional features, but it may be reinforced by
institutional details that, though not discriminatory in and of themselves, enable discriminatory
practices by severely limiting the prospect of legal remediation. An example of such institutional
details is the legal and administrative framework for addressing allegations of workplace discrim-
ination in the U.S. In almost all cases, employees alleging workplace discrimination must pursue
legal or administrative remedies on their own.3 Compensatory damages are capped at a maximum
of $300,000 for large companies, and considerably lower for smaller ones. The burden of proof
for awarding punitive damages is such that those awards are rare even conditional on employee’s
prevailing at trial (Captain, 2017). The low odds of an employee winning a discrimination-based
legal dispute and the low upside of such a victory overwhelm the legal fees and other investments
into a protracted administrative and/or legal process demanded of the complainants.
The situation that our example of Alice and Bob captures is generic, and the identity dimension
in question could have nothing whatsoever to do with the team tasks at hand. It could be gender,
or race, or ethnicity. But Alice and Bob could also be bureaucrats belonging to different political
parties, the supervisor suspecting his underling of “deep state” preferences that would lead to an
under-investment of effort into an ideologically charged task. The latter possibility underscores two
immediate senses in which the analysis of discrimination in question is of political significance: it
applies to discrimination within a government bureaucracy and can help shed light on politically
3The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which is charged with certi-
fying discrimination complaints under the existing non-discrimination statutes, brings the cases on
behalf of the employees very rarely – filing, for example, only 86 lawsuits alleging discrimination in
fiscal year 2016 (Captain, 2017).
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driven purges of bureaucracy that often dominate the news cycle (Lewis, 2011; Gordon, 2009).4
Ironically, protections against workplace discrimination in U.S. federal and state governments –
by far the largest employers in the country, and encompassing countless principal-agent relationships
that hold the potential for discriminatory behavior – are sometimes weaker than in the private
sector. Not only are complainants against discrimination within the federal bureaucracy barred
from seeking punitive damages, but both federal and state bureaucracies are exempt from some
of the anti-discrimination protections that bind on private employers.5 Recent empirical work
provides evidence of discriminatory behavior by federal government employees (Giulietti, Tonin
and Vlassopoulos, 2017), hinting at the culture of discrimination.6 The bottom line is the familiar
4While in the U.S., civil servants are protected against discrimination on the grounds of political
affiliation, those protections are not constitutional, and the expansive interpretations of the Article
II of the U.S. Constitution, which have become increasingly influential, especially within the current
administration, clearly undermine their force (Huq and Ginsburg, 2018). Even within the context
of the existing protections, the leaders’ leeway for selection for special tasks and re-assignment to
other duties is considerable, and the comparatively large share of “political appointments” creates
an altogether unprotected class.
5Both federal and state governments are exempt from the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), and the state bureaucracies are, further, exempt from the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA) and from the state employment-discrimination laws based on sexual orienta-
tion. With the Trump administration’s reversal of the Obama-era policy that the Civil Rights Act
implied protections against sexual orientation-based discrimination in the workplace, the federal
bureaucracy is no longer subject to those constraints as well.
6Although we are not aware of the systematic studies of discrimination across federal bureau-
cracy, the gaps in salary and promotion for government employees across demographic groups are
suggestive. Per U.S. Federal Government Office of Personnel Management FedScope Federal Hu-
man Resource Data (accessed January 8, 2018), in 2017, the average salary of female members
of the federal bureaucracy was about $4800 lower than of the male ones. African Americans and
Hispanics earned $6200 and $5300 less than whites, respectively. When separating by occupation
group, women earned less than men in 85% of different job categories. The corresponding numbers
for African Americans and Hispanics are, respectively, 86% and 76%. Despite accounting for 43%
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discriminatory pattern and the society lacking a critical element of effective social order – equal
treatment of citizens and legitimacy of social and political institutions.
The first line of attack on discrimination is often through the legal system, seeking to enforce
equal treatment laws and non-discrimination statues. But when it is traceable to determinants that
fall outside the letter of the statute or when the legal enforcement process lacks adequate tools or will
to address it, discrimination is, once again, a fundamentally political problem. For reasons indicated
above, these conditions describe strategic discrimination. Because it is, most proximately, a function
of individuals’ higher-order beliefs, rather than of specific, clearly discriminatory, institutions, it can
be self-reinforcing – yielding observable behavioral patterns that, in effect, belie the true extent of
discrimination and often “slip” through the statutory net. And to prevent such outcomes, one
needs mechanisms for shifting the social norms that clearly go beyond the inadequate enforcement
framework described above.
The search for understanding the persistence of discriminatory patterns, the social and political
inequality they entail and reinforce, as well as for institutional solutions to these problems must start
with an improved understanding of the mechanisms underlying discrimination and their behavioral
attributes. The primary aim of this paper is to contribute to the latter by experimentally isolating
the distinctly strategic effects of individuals’ responses to sharing a group identity in a principal-
agent environment.
In psychology, the phenomenon of prejudicial judgment is grounded in a psychological disposi-
tion to a bias known as the ultimate attribution error (Pettigrew, 1979; Hewstone, 1990). The bias
concerns differences in how observers account for identical levels of performance from individuals
who do or do not share the observer’s relevant social identity. Thus, for example, when observing
good outcomes from individuals with shared group identity (e.g., a male team leader’s male under-
ling in gender-salient environments), the team leader/principal will be more inclined to attribute
those outcomes to factors (e.g., effort) that are controllable by the underling/agent than when that
principal sees those outcomes coming from out-group actors (e.g., a female team member in the
same environment). By the same token, the principals will be marginally more likely to associate
good outcomes from the out-group agent with factors, such as e.g., favorable circumstances, that are
of all federal employees, women hold only 33% of the supervisory and leadership positions.
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not in the agent’s control. The relationships described here, however, are fundamentally strategic in
that outcomes will depend not only on the actions by those supervised but also on their expectations
of the feedback from their supervisors. When we observe asymmetric attribution in these settings,
it may be pure prejudice, but it may also reflect correct, while clearly regrettable, beliefs about
differences in performance arising from strategic responses to the asymmetric beliefs and choices
of others. While the economic theory of principal-agent relationships and statistical discrimination
has understood that it does not take a psychologically driven misattribution to create and sustain
stereotypes (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Spence, 1973; Coate and Loury, 1993), there has been a
gap between the recognition of the different contributors to discrimination and their empirical eval-
uation in either political or economic contexts. Similarly, there has been little or no uptake of this
issue in the political economy literature, which has, otherwise, yielded considerable work on agent
choice and oversight in principal-agent relationships in hierarchies (Ting, 2002; Miller, 2005; Besley,
2006; Ting, 2011; Gailmard and Patty, 2012; Bueno de Mesquita and Landa, 2015).
Our analysis yields a number of novel results that help close this gap, some of which we
highlight here. First, our findings suggest that the patterns of beliefs associated with the ultimate
attribution error may emerge as a fundamentally strategic phenomenon (though, as we will see
shortly, not necessarily fully consistent with equilibrium play). In strategic environments, principals
who reward their agents contingent on the outcomes tend to attribute good outcomes, on average,
more readily to their agents’ effort when they share a group identity and reward those agents more
frequently. When principals’ and agents’ choices are not strategically co-dependent, the attribution
asymmetries disappear along with the possibility of (asymmetric) rewards.
Second, the agents’ choices suggest the presence of an important subtlety, which we identify
both theoretically and in our experimental data, and which does not neatly match up with the
principals’ revealed expectations. We show, in particular, that agents’ choices are subject to two
effects that sometimes push in opposite directions. The first, the expected bias effect manifests in the
agents’ effort choices increasing in the expectation of the principals’ in-group bias in rewards. The
second, the expected demand effect, is the agents’ effort choice increasing with their expectations of
the demands from the principals. While the expected bias effect reinforces the principals’ asym-
metric attribution, the expected demand effect runs counter to it precisely because the principals’
higher demands tend to occur in out-group matches. This helps explain another of our findings:
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that principals tend to do better at anticipating the choices of in-group than of out-group agents –
they underestimate the possibility that agents in out-group matches increase their effort in response
to their expectations of higher demands from the principals.
2 Discrimination: Variety and Identification
We analyze discrimination and prejudice in the relationship of delegation found naturally in the
contexts of hierarchical relationships in bureaucracies. Discrimination, in a textbook account, refers
to a practice of treating persons who perform equally in a physical or material sense unequally in a
way that is related to an observable characteristic such as race, ethnicity, or gender.7 Thus defined,
discrimination is useful for operationalizing an anti-discriminatory policy, but if we take seriously the
effect of the expectation of discriminatory treatment on the agents’ choices, then observed unequal
treatment may not be the full story of discrimination. This idea is at the core of the present study. A
discriminatory impulse is distinguishable from prejudice – a faulty or inflexible generalization about
members of a group (Allport, 1954), which is often a key psychological determinant of discrimination.
Unlike discrimination, which may be rationalizable with a set of potentially correct beliefs, prejudice
necessarily entails a mistake.
An influential theoretical approach to analyzing the determinants of discrimination views it
as resulting from a taste for discriminating against out-group members (Becker, 1971; Akerlof
and Kranton, 2000). The mechanism underlying this kind of discrimination is, in the first place,
psychological: the differential treatment it envisions is not a product of a rational response, but
rather of prejudice.8
In contrast to the taste for discrimination, statistical discrimination does not presuppose a
prejudice; it is grounded in a rational inference about the likely features of group members given
the relevant statistics of the demographic populations (Phelps, 1972). But those statistics, of
7See Holzer and Neumark (2000) for a more detailed elaboration.
8A somewhat different version of this mechanism, the ultimate attribution error (Pettigrew,
1979) manifests when individuals are biased – tracking shared vs. unshared salient social identity
– in their attribution of outcomes to the contributing factors controlled by the outcome-generating
agent rather than factors not controlled by her (Hewstone, 1990).
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course, reflect groups’ distinct histories, experiences, etc. – factors which could arise endogenously
from others’ treatment of them – and, as Arrow (1973) points out, they can be, in that sense, self-
confirming. When the relevant choices are sufficiently close to each other in time, asymmetric beliefs
about members of different groups can, through mutual strategic feedback, become self-confirming
even when those groups are identical ex-ante.9 This latter idea, that discriminatory behavior may
rest on higher-order beliefs about strategic feedback, suggests the possibility of discrimination that
is a specifically strategic phenomenon. (To be sure, even when that is the case, it may or may not be
an equilibrium phenomenon – depending on whether the higher-order beliefs and actions are jointly
consistent.)
Strategic discrimination, which is sometimes described as the Arrovian version of statistical
discrimination, has informed a number of important debates about both public policy and politics.
As some scholars have argued, policy interventions such as affirmative action programs can induce
differences in principals’ beliefs about how much effort members of different social groups exert,
prompting the principal to discriminate; the resulting discrimination reduces incentives for mem-
bers of the disadvantaged group to invest, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy (Loury, 1976; Coate and
Loury, 1993).10 With respect to supply-side behavior that is consistent with the strategic expecta-
tions at the core of the Arrovian approach, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Kanthak and Woon
(2015) find that women are less likely to select into competitive environments and pre-labor market
discrimination has been shown to affect career choices by minorities and women (Benabou, 1996;
Neumark and McLennan, 1995). These studies go considerable distance in distinguishing the taste
for discrimination and the statistical discrimination mechanisms. However, because differences in
group statistics are typically part of the specific principal-agent interaction analyzed, a controlled
laboratory environment holds particular promise for getting at the distinctly strategic determinants
of the principals’ responses.
9While the controlled observational studies cited above document discrimination, they leave aside
the question of what drives discrimination in principal-agent settings.
10In the context of electoral representation, the conclusion may be the opposite: voters may be
better off with an out-group candidate because she will work to earn the electoral support that an
in-group candidate will take for granted (Swain, 1993; Landa and Duell, 2015).
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Several previous laboratory studies have made steps in that direction. Fershtman and Gneezy
(2001) provide evidence of differences in attribution in interactions with a strategic component
(modeled as a trust game) and without it (modeled as a dictator game), but find that senders’
stereotype-driven beliefs in the trust game are inconsistent with the return decisions, which do not
vary with the group identity conditions. The result could be explained by the fact that the receiver
has no affirmative (motivated) reason in the experiment to act on the stereotypes, whether the
senders’ or her own, because the payoffs to the receiver’s choice in the trust game are independent
of whatever beliefs she may have about the sender. To capture the effect on subjects’ beliefs
and choices that models strategic discrimination, our experimental design implements strategic
feedback both before and after the receivers’ choices. The important experiments in Fryer, Goeree
and Holt (2005) and Haan, Offerman and Sloof (2015) simulate both principals’ hiring decisions
and agents’ choices whether to invest into education, and report evidence of strategically reinforced
discrimination in settings that contain both strategic feedbacks. In both studies, the publicity of the
initial asymmetries is key, but makes it difficult to identify the extent to which the strategic actions
they report remain anchored in the seeded population statistics, or, to put it differently, in the
distinctly Phelpsian framework of statistical discrimination. The design of our study obviates this
concern by avoiding the seeding of discrimination with either the asymmetric group-level parameters
or the asymmetries in the history of play. Further, the Fryer et al. and Hahn et al. studies do not
endow principals with distinct group identities, while our study assigned potentially differing group
identities to agents and principals. This allows interpretations of outcomes to arise endogenously
entirely in response to beliefs about the consequences of shared vs. unshared social identities – the
mechanism at the core of Arrovian strategic statistical discrimination.
Identifying Arrovian Statistical Discrimination in a Principal-Agent Environment We
highlight three features of our experimental design that allow for the identification of strategic dis-
crimination: First, to separate the strategic effect from the psychological one, we create counterfac-
tual environments. (1) We compare the beliefs of principals whose reward strategies are constant
in outcome to those of incentivizing principals whose reward decisions vary with the observed out-
comes; and (2) we compare the principals’ beliefs in a treatment that implements a strategic to those
in a corresponding non-strategic environment. The strategic environment has two-sided feedback,
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allowing the agents to condition their effort choices on their expectations of the principals’ reward
decisions and the principals to condition their reports of beliefs about agents’ choices on their ex-
pectations of how agents likely evaluated their own expectations of being rewarded. This creates the
possibility of strategically reinforced identity-contingent incentivized beliefs. In the non-strategic
environment, whatever asymmetry in beliefs is observed must be due to psychological, taste-for-
discrimination factors like the ultimate attribution error. Using that behavior as a baseline, we can
interpret the behavioral differences between strategic and non-strategic environments as explainable
by the specifically strategic aspects of the interaction.
Second, to further separate strategically driven belief asymmetries from the non-strategic
(Phelpsian) statistical belief asymmetries, we adopt a design that does not pre-treat subjects with
reputations of social groups. In particular, we induce artificial group identities in a treatment related
to the “minimal group paradigm” (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) – an approach to inducing a (weak)
notion of identity that is seemingly unrelated to the behavior of interest – and provide minimal
feedback to subjects in the course of play. This approach advances our overall goal of isolating
the beliefs-driven determinants of strategic discrimination from the influence of other elements of
the social environment that may also affect willingness to discriminate, e.g., reputation costs for
discrimination.
Third, to avoid the possibility that principals may rationally use their reward instruments to
elicit different behaviors from different types of agents to effect a type separation in equilibrium, we
tie the principal’s payoffs to her beliefs about the realization of agent’s underlying type vs. effort,
but not to the principal’s decision whether to reward the agent.
3 A simple model of principal-agent relationships
3.1 Set-up
We capture the underlying strategic principal-agent relationship in a simple model of incomplete
contracting. The principal faces an agent with privately known type t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The principal’s
commonly known prior is assumed to be uniform on that support. The agent chooses her effort
level, e ∈ {1, 2, 3}, which is costly to herself, with α denoting the marginal cost. The outcome F
is given by F = t + e + ω , where the noise, ω, is a random draw from a uniform distribution on
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{−1, 0, 1}. Thus, F ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}.
The payoffs of both the principal and the agent depend on F, though in different ways. The
principal observes F (but not t, e, or ω), and then makes two (simultaneous) choices. The first,
the decision on whether to give a bonus, b, to the agent, has no direct effect on the principal’s
utility (but does affect it indirectly through the agent’s effort level in expectation of the principal’s
bonus-awarding rule). The second choice has a direct effect on the principal’s utility, and reveals her
beliefs about the determinants of the agent’s performance. That decision is the choice of whether to
double the t or e component in her payoff, which the principal must make without directly observing
t or e (i.e., just with her knowledge of F and, as we will see below, the common knowledge between
her and the agent of their respective group identities). The principal’s payoff, then, is computed
as F + De + (1 −D)t, where D ∈ {0, 1} is the indicator variable such that D = 1 if the principal
decides to double e and D = 0 if she doubles t. D, thus, may be interpreted as the principal’s belief
whether the observed value of the outcome can be attributed more to the agent’s effort or her type.
The agent’s payoff is given by G(F, b, e), where
G(F, b, e) =
 β
√
F + b− αe if the bonus is awarded
β
√
F − αe if the bonus is not awarded.
G(·) is, thus, increasing in F and b and decreasing in e. The game ends when payoffs are realized.
3.2 Best Responses and Equilibria
There are many Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this game, since any reward rule by the principal
can be sustained in equilibrium. To focus our analysis, we restrict attention to two types of reward
rules: constant in the outcomes that the principal observes, and monotonically increasing in those
outcomes. We will refer to the equilibria corresponding to the second type of rule as the outcome-
contingent-play (OCP) equilibria, and to the equilibria with the first type of rule as the outcome-
noncontingent-play (ONCP) equilibria.
Intuitively, in ONCP equilibrium, the agents choose minimal levels of effort, inducing partial
separation through outcomes, and the principal will always prefer to double type. In contrast, in
OCP equilibria, principals’ strategies may create incentives for forward-looking agents to invest
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into effort. We will call principals who are playing cutpoint strategies which call for rewarding
outcomes that meet a given threshold and not rewarding otherwise as incentivizing principals and
their strategies as incentivizing strategies.
The parameter values we use in the experiment are b = 1, α = 1.95, and β = 6, and we
next provide more specific predictions for OCP equilibrium play under those parameters. Here, the
incentivizing principals reward agents upon observing outcomes F ≥ F̂ , F̂ ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} and do
not reward otherwise. In the cutpoint equilibria with the highest expected welfare for the principal,
which are the standard predictions in such games (Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita
and Landa, 2015), the principal chooses an incentivizing strategy that calls for rewarding if and
only if F ≥ z, z ∈ {3, 4, 5}, and the agent chooses a level of effort e∗ such that e∗+ t = 4. Thus, the
agent of type 1 chooses effort 3, agent of type 2 chooses effort level 2, and agent of type 3 chooses
effort level 1.11 These are pooling equilibria, and in these equilibria, the principal’s beliefs are such
that she is indifferent between choosing to double e or t.
One can construct equilibria in which the threshold for receiving a bonus is z ∈ {1, 2, 6, 7}.
Those equilibria are semi-separating, in that the principal’s posterior beliefs about the agent’s type
are not uniform, and there is a critical value in the F̂ space such that the principal will double type
for F > F̂ and double effort for F < F̂ .
Given the payoff function, the principal will always prefer the pooling OCP equilibria – the
equilibria with highest expected outcomes – to the equilibria with semi-separation, whether they are
OCP or ONCP equilibria. That is, given the payoff structure, the principal always prefers to obtain
the highest possible expected outcome F , in spite of the greater uncertainty about attribution that
that entails, than to play an equilibrium in which it is easier to make a correct attribution but at
the cost of a lower expected outcome F .
11As is standard, these effort predictions are for agents endowed with the model payoffs in the
experiment. In the implemented game, however, subjects face two kinds of uncertainty: about the
realized noise draw and the strategic uncertainty about principals’ critical outcome thresholds for
rewarding the agents. This means that the actual choices of our subjects in the role of agents may be
contingent on their expectations of outcomes and rewards, and reflect their underlying (unmodeled)
risk preferences. We will examine the effects of risk preferences below.
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The multiplicity of equilibria creates a strategic coordination problem for the players. The
presence of this problem is an intentional feature of our design. The rationale is two-fold. First,
contractual uncertainty of reward and promotion expectations is a wide-spread feature of empirical
environments with incomplete contracts, and, in particular, of environments in which discrimina-
tion is typically reported. One of our primary goals is to understand how the players behave in
environments of precisely this kind. Second, allowing the players to take auxiliary actions that can
reduce uncertainty over mutual expectations (e.g., making cheap-talk announcements before or in
the middle of play) can have a separate psychological self-committing effect that is distinct from the
purely informational coordination effect, altering what we think is the standard baseline behavior
in such settings.
To get a handle on the expectations of agents’ behavior in this setting, consider the following
best-response analysis. Suppose the agent knows that the principal’s reward rule is of the form
“award a bonus iff F > F̂ ,” but is uncertain of F̂ . Let p(F̂ ) be expected probability of bonus for
F = F̂ , where 1 ≥ p(7) ≥ p(6) ≥ p(5) ≥ ... ≥ p(1) ≥ 0. For each t, each choice e, there are three
possible values of F : t + e − 1, t + e, t + e + 1. We can write the expected payoff for an agent of
type t from the effort choice e given the realization of noise ω as
1
3
E[uA(t, e, ω; p(·))|ω = −1] +
1
3
E[uA(t, e, ω; p(·))|ω = 0] +
1
3
E[uA(t, e, ω; p(·))|ω = 1],
where p(·) is given by p(F̂ ) evaluated at the values of outcome given by the corresponding (t, e, ω).
Comparing this expectation at e to one evaluated at e = e+ 1 and simplifying, we obtain that
the expected payoff for e+ 1 is higher than for e if and only if
(t+ e+ 2)
1






















The agent’s best response is, then, to choose e = 1 if inequality (1) fails at e = 1, choose e = 2
if inequality (1) holds at e = 1 but fails at e = 2 and choose e = 3 if inequality (1) holds at e = 2.
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Note that the inequality includes two terms reflecting the agent’s beliefs about the principal:
p(t+ e+ 2) and p(t+ e− 1). The first is the probability that the principal awards the bonus for the
outcome that would be just out of the agent’s reach at a given effort level e – i.e., for the outcome
that is one greater than what the agent could obtain with the luckiest noise draw at that value of
effort. The second term is the probability that the principal would award the bonus for the outcome
that the agent would assure at a given effort level e even if the noise draw should turn out to be
most unlucky. Inequality (1) is easier to satisfy when the former is larger (it enters the left-hand
side with a positive sign) and when the latter is smaller (it enters with a negative sign). In what
follows, we will refer to the conditions on these quantities implied by inequality (1) as the agents’
participation constraints. We will refer to the lowest value of outcome that can earn a bonus as
the principal’s demand and to the agents’ expectations of that value, which we modeled by p(·), as
their expectations of the principal’s demand. Assuming that the participation constraints hold, a
distribution p(·) that sets a higher p(t+ e+ 2) and lower p(t+ e− 1) than does another distribution
describes a principal the agent believes will reward less for relatively low levels of performance
yet reward more for performance levels that are relatively high – in other words, a principal who
makes a stronger demand for high effort. Inequality (1) implies that given that agents’ participation
constraints hold, agents choose higher effort when they expect the principal to be more demanding.
Of course, when the promise of reward becomes too remote (p(t+ e+ 2) becomes sufficiently low),
the principal is “too demanding”: for a given t, the incentives created for the agent may be such
that the optimal effort actually drops.
Note that the baseline game described above does not assign identities to the players. In the
identity treatments of the experiment, we prime and reveal to subjects their group identities by
fixing labels to principals and agents and making them common knowledge within the pairs, but we
do not alter the payoff structure described above. Because the payoff structure does not depend on
these identities, one equilibrium behavioral expectation is that identity has no effect on behavior.
However, because players observe social identity matches, they may choose identity-contingent
strategies leading to different equilibrium profiles being played in different identity matches (e.g.,
an OCP equilibrium profile with higher (lower) threshold for reward in in-group matches and an
OCP equilibrium profile with lower (higher) threshold for reward in out-group matches). In this
way, identity matches could matter as selectors of different equilibrium profiles. This role of iden-
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tity is encapsulated in the hypotheses (below) concerning principals’ (implicit) identity-contingent
demands for outcomes necessary for receiving a bonus, the agents’ identity-contingent expectations
of principals’ demands, and the agents’ own identity-contingent (effort) choices.
3.3 Hypotheses
The hypotheses below derive from three sources of theoretical expectations: (1) the analysis of
OCP and ONCP equilibria above; (2) the expectation of identity-contingent play in OCP equilibria,
based on the analysis above and on the expectations of identity-contingent (and in particular of
own-identity-favoring) play reported in the literature; and, (3) psychologically driven expectations
that comport with theoretical and empirical results reported in the extant literature. While the
behavioral comparison of the OCP and the ONCP play is an important element of our analysis, our
primary focus is on the OCP play, which is the context where we expect to see the identity-driven
effects, and so, in particular, on the OCP play that favors members of one’s own group.
While, as we explained above, there are multiple equilibria in this setting, including equilibria
indexed by different degrees of identity-contingent bias, we formulate the following hypotheses as
descriptions of what we expect to be the average tendency on the part of the subjects. Our first
three hypotheses are motivated by the expectation of sustained own-identity favoring play (Chen
and Li, 2009; Landa and Duell, 2015), which, as mentioned, is consistent with OCP equilibrium play
in our environment. The first hypothesis concerns what we referred to as “the principals’ demands.”
Hypothesis 1 (Principals’ in-group bias in rewards): principals have lower demands for outcome
from in-group agents than from out-group agents.
The next hypothesis restates the expectation, but now as corresponding to the agents’ own
beliefs about the principals:
Hypothesis 2 (Agents’ expectations of principals’ in-group bias in rewards): Agents expect prin-
cipals to have lower demands in in-group matches than in out-group matches.
Our analysis of the agents’ best responses in the OCP play yields the following hypothesis on
the effect of a shift in the agent’s expectation of the principal’s demands, which we refer to as the
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expected demand effect.12
Hypothesis 3 (expected demand effect): Assuming the agents’ participation constraints hold, agents’
effort choices increase with their expectations of higher demands by the principals.
The hypothesis requires that the agents’ participation constraints (discussed in detail above)
hold – that, in effect, the agents perceive the principals’ demands to be such that they are worth
trying to meet. We state the remaining hypothesis focusing on the case where these constraints
indeed hold. (As the discussion of the results below suggests, though there is some evidence that
this assumption fails for a small subset of the subjects, it is borne out in the bulk of our data.)
The agent’s best response to lower demands from the principal is lower effort, and, to a higher
demand, a higher effort. Given the expectation of lower demands in the own-identity-favoring OCP
equilibria, in-group agents should, then, choose a lower effort, and out-group agents should choose
a higher one. The agents’ expectations of the principals’ in-group bias in rewards, thus, condition
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4a (Agents’ equilibrium best response in own-identity-favoring OCP equilibria) Agents
with higher expectations of principals’ in-group bias in rewards choose higher levels of effort in out-
group than in in-group matches.
Hypothesis 4a is, notably, contrary to the expectation of own-identity-favoring behavioral bias
on the part of the agents.13 We next formulate that expectation, which were refer to as the Agents’
in-group bias effect, as a rival hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4b (Agents’ in-group bias effect) All else equal, agents with expectations of higher
principals’ in-group bias in rewards choose higher levels of effort in in-group than in out-group
matches.
Linking principals’ attribution decisions to agents’ expected choices suggested by the previous
two hypotheses, we can generate predictions regarding principals’ attribution decisions. If agents
12Apart from the evidence on this effect, the experimental results we describe will also speak to
other predictions of OCP equilibria, though they are secondary to our focus in this paper.
13The contradiction would disappear if the participation constraints were to fail for out-group
agents but hold for in-group agents.
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condition on beliefs suggested by Hypothesis 2, then we should expect agents to choose higher effort
in out-group than in-group matches, suggesting the following hypothesis14:
Hypothesis 5a (Principals’ own-identity-favoring OCP equilibrium attribution): Principals’ propen-
sity to attribute a given outcome to effort rather than type is lower in in-group than in out-group
matches.
However, if the expectation of agents’ in-group-bias effect (Hypothesis 4b) is correct and
dominates the expected demand effect, the correct expectation for the attribution by the principals
would be the following rival hypothesis, which is behaviorally consistent with the prediction of the
ultimate attribution bias:
Hypothesis 5b (Principals’ in-group-bias-effect attribution): Principals’ propensity to attribute a
given outcome to effort rather than type is higher in in-group than in out-group matches.
Our last two hypotheses are meant to isolate the effect of strategically driven expectations on
attribution decisions. The first of these hypotheses concerns the attribution choices of principals who
are playing outcome-non-contingent reward strategies. We anticipate these principals’ attribution
choices by asking how they would affect agents’ best responses. As explained above, in contrast to
the principals who are playing outcome-contingent strategies and who may have a bias in reward
decisions, we should expect these principals’ attribution choices to be symmetric.
Hypothesis 6 Principals’ asymmetric attribution exists only for principals in outcome-contingent-
play equilibria.
The last hypothesis is that asymmetric attributions are driven by the mutual expectations
that are set in motion by the strategic feedback, from rewards to the effort choice in expectation of
rewards. When such expectations are irrelevant, we should see no attribution asymmetries.
Hypothesis 7 The asymmetric attribution effect disappears in the absence of strategic incentives.
14Note that this hypothesis depends on the assumption that subjects in out-group matches satisfy
the participation constraints not too much worse than the subjects in the in-group matches – the
assumption that, in effect, holds across the OCP equilibria that maximize the principal’s welfare.
When that assumption fails, the claim of the hypothesis may not hold.
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4 Experimental design
The structure of our laboratory experiment approximates the principal-agent relationship in a hi-
erarchical bureaucracy, which we explore with two experimental treatments. The STRATEGIC
treatment features the opportunity to reward the agent with a bonus (henceforth, referred to as
the availability of the sanctioning device), following closely the model described above. The NON-
STRATEGIC treatment removes the sanctioning device.15 The experiment included 110 subjects
in the STRATEGIC treatment (2200 subject-round observations) and 38 subjects in the NON-
STRATEGIC treatment (760 subject-round observations).
Prior to the principal-agent game in each session, subjects’ identities are induced as described
in detail below.16 Then, subjects are assigned to the role of either an agent (called “Player 1”)
or a principal (“Player 2”) and remain in that role for the duration of the experiment. They are
randomly re-matched into pairs of one agent and one principal in each of 20 rounds of a session.
The implemented random matching protocol is the perfect stranger matching for the first (number
of subjects in the session)/2-rounds of each session, followed, in subsequent rounds, by subjects
meeting previous matches again in random order once.17 Subjects received a show-up fee of $7 and
15In order to ascertain the relative power of incentives created in our treatments, we conducted ad-
ditional exploratory experimental analysis in the standard principal-agent settings with no identity-
inducement (all treatments are described in detail in Section A in the appendix). We measure this
by comparing the average responsiveness of agent’s effort to her type with and without identity and
find no significant difference (Section B.5 in the appendix). No further treatments were conducted.
The analysis reported in the main text and the appendix describes the full set of observations. The
experiment was not pre-registered.
16At the beginning of each experimental session, right before the identity inducement, we elicit
risk-attitudes in a non-hypothetical, small stakes setting following the design presented by Holt
and Laury (2002). We evaluate how risk preferences affect agents’ choices in Section B.3.3 in the
appendix. We show that the magnitudes of the expected bias and the expected demand effects are
importantly contingent on agents’ risk preferences, pointing to an important under-explored factor
in accounting for individuals’ responses to discrimination.
17Matching protocol and anonymized interaction between subjects precludes direct exchanges,
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performance-based payments of on average $23. Payments from the principal-agent game where
taken from the two highest round-payoffs from three randomly selected rounds.18
Group identity inducement At the beginning of each session of both the STRATEGIC and
the NON-STRATEGIC treatments, subjects were assigned to groups according to their stated
preferences for either Klee or Kandinsky paintings and performed in a quiz collaboratively with
their new fellow painter group members. Members of both groups, Klees and Kandinskys, in all
treatments performed approximately equally well. In the subsequent principal-agent game part
of the experimental session, the identities of both subjects within a matched pair were displayed
for them on the screen along with icon-sized paintings by the corresponding artists. In this way,
subjects learn whether they are in an in-group or out-group match.19
STRATEGIC treatment: Principal-agent game with sanctioning device The game sim-
ulated in the STRATEGIC treatment mirrors the structure and payoffs laid out in Section 3. By
monetarily incentivizing subjects in the role of agents, we create concerns about outcomes because
agents value receiving a bonus from the principals. Subjects in the role of principals benefit from
high outcomes. While the principals do not bear a direct cost of awarding the bonus, the agents’
choices respond to the principals’ bonus-awarding strategy. Because those choices affect principals’
and thus provides us approximately with as many independent observations as subjects in the
experiment. We report standard errors clustered by subject throughout. We find no robust evidence
for learning effects. Our main results are robust to accounting for the history of play at the subject-
level and, except for our finding on bias in attribution decisions, all results are stable when comparing
first and second half of the experiment (see Section B.3.5 in the appendix).
18This helps avoid endowment effects and hedging in lottery-like choices under uncertainty (Char-
ness, Gneezy and Halladay, 2016).
19See Tajfel and Billig (1974), Chen and Li (2009), and Landa and Duell (2015) for the use
of painter-preferences to induce identities. Considerable experimental literature has shown the
effectiveness of minimal groups in inducing responses to identity that resemble those observed
outside the laboratory with naturally occurring group identities and the monotonicity of identity
effect in identity strength (Eckel and Grossman, 2005).
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payoffs, they create a benefit to the principals of a bonus-rewarding strategy that induces higher
choices by the agents, as is standard in moral hazard settings. As will become apparent in our
analysis, agents in our experiment clearly respond to their expectations of principals’ demands.
All subjects, agents and principals, were instructed that agents would be given payoff infor-
mation on the terminal screens whenever they are making their choice of effort. Before agents
make their investment decision but after they observe their randomly assigned type, they are asked:
“What minimal outcome do you think Player 2 will demand to give you a bonus?” They are shown
payoffs, contingent on their answer type, as a function of the level of effort they may choose and the
possible values of noise. Agents may click through all possible values of outcome in any order, may
choose to go back and forth between values, or not select to see any potential payoffs. Inputting
their expected minimal rewarded outcomes to generate contingent payoffs enables the agents to
obtain a more highly rewarded choice, thus creating a monetarily incentivized revelation of their
belief.20 All subjects (principals and agents) were shown the agents’ decisions screen and extensive
examples of principals’ applying incentivizing strategies in the instructions as well as in the pre-play
comprehension quiz (all these examples are identity-blind).
After agents made their choice of effort, and outcomes are realized, principals are asked to dou-
ble either the effort or the type component in their round payoff. In making that choice, principals
are effectively stating their (motivated) belief on whether outcomes are more driven by the agent-
controlled attribute (effort – an internal, dispositional attribute) or by agent-uncontrolled attribute
(type – an external, situational attribute that is randomly assigned). The principal’s doubling de-
cision, thus, models the choice situation that is at the core of the ultimate attribution error. In this
way, principals’ beliefs are elicited monetarily rewarding correctness in the attribution decision. For
convenience, we will refer to the principal’s decision to double effort upon observing a given outcome
as “attributing the outcome to effort” and the decision to double type as “attributing the outcome
to type.”21 Because agents’ beliefs are elicited by a procedure in which the effort choices and the
20More specifically, we capture agents’ beliefs by recording the mean expected demands of all
clicks they make in each round. Section B.3.2 in the appendix gives more data on frequency and
extent of agents’ use of this tool.
21On the screen where principals make reward and attribution decision, we also asked principals
whether they thought type or effort was the higher quantity (with a strong correlation of .74 (p = .00)
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underlying beliefs are (procedurally) interdependent, we should expect the relationship between
those variables in the data to be closer than would be otherwise. For reasons of external validity,
variation in the responsiveness of agent actions to their beliefs is, therefore, not an appropriate
focus for a study with this design. Our focus in characterizing strategic discrimination is, rather,
on principals’ attribution and reward decisions and on responsiveness of agents’ beliefs/actions to
the principals.
NON-STRATEGIC treatment: principal-agent game without sanctioning device The
NON-STRATEGIC treatment replaces the principals’ sanctioning tool with exogenously given in-
centives to the agents. In this treatment, agents’ payoffs are given by G(F, e) = β
√
F − e, with
β = 4. Note that, as in the STRATEGIC treatment, G(·) is increasing in outcome F and de-
creasing in effort e. The functional form of the payoffs and the parametrization were chosen to
be as close as possible to those in the STRATEGIC treatment and to induce optimal choices for
agents, conditional on their type, that are identical to the optimal choices in the maximal principal
welfare (3-4-5 threshold) OCP equilibria in the STRATEGIC treatment game. Principals observe
the outcome and are asked to make their attribution decision, incentivized in the same way as in
the STRATEGIC treatment.22
Summary of the experimental set-up The sequence of moves in each round of the experiment
is as follows (the principal’s reward decision and elicitation of agent’s beliefs is omitted in the NON-
STRATEGIC treatment):
1. Agents are assigned a type and privately informed about its realization (1, 2, or 3).
2. Agents choose a level of effort (1, 2, or 3) and state their expectation about which minimal
outcome principals demand to see to give a bonus (1-7, expected demands – agents’ beliefs).
between subjects’ guess and their attribution decision.
22A different way of designing the study to get at the difference between strategic and non-
strategic settings would be to randomly assign probabilities of sanctioning device being available
rather than exogenously adjusting payoffs. The downside of that approach in our setting is that
a low probability of being rewarded (for the non-strategic setting) would imply that agents’ effort
would approach the minimal possible level, undermining the variation in the principal’s beliefs.
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3. Noise and outcome are realized where the value of outcome is the sum of agent’s type (1, 2,
or 3), agent’s chosen level of effort (1, 2, or 3), and a noise realization (-1, 0, or 1).
4. Principals learn the value of outcome (1-7).
5. Principals choose whether to attribute outcomes to type or effort (attribution decision –
principals’ beliefs) by doubling the payoff contribution of the type or effort component of
outcome and whether to give the agent a bonus (reward decision).
6. Round feedback: principals observe whether type or effort was higher and agents learn the
principal’s reward decision (where applicable).
5 Results
In Section 5.1, we first summarize and compare principals’ choices across in- and out-group matches
as well as in STRATEGIC and NON-STRATEGIC treatments. Consistent with the theoretical
expectations set out above, we distinguish behavior of two sets of principals, incentivizing and
non-incentivizing, whose strategies suggest very different best responses from the agents. We es-
tablish that incentivizing principals in the STRATEGIC treatment tend to be in-group biased in
their rewards choices and to make identity-contingent attributions of outcomes. In contrast, non-
incentivizing principals in the STRATEGIC treatment and principals in the NON-STRATEGIC
treatment do not make attributions contingent on identity. In Section 5.2, we investigate agents’ ef-
fort choices. While we find that in the aggregate, those choices are not identity-contingent, focusing
on agents’ effort choices in interaction with their expectations about principals’ outcome demands
(relevant to the STRATEGIC treatment) yields a more nuanced picture. We show, in particular,
that agents respond in heterogeneous but identity-contingent way to their expectations of principals
demands and that those responses are driven by their expectations of principals’ demand and of
principals’ bias in rewards. In Section 5.3 we elaborate on the interpretation of identity-contingent
choices and beliefs and provide evidence that principals fail to correctly anticipate the strength of
the expected demand effect in out-group agents.23
5.1 Principals’ choices and beliefs
To properly characterize the attribution decisions and develop the comparison of those decisions
in the STRATEGIC and NON-STRATEGIC treatments, it is necessary to begin by distinguishing
23Summary statistics for all variables are given in Section B of the appendix.
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incentivizing and non-incentivizing principals in the STRATEGIC treatment (the distinction is
moot in the NON-STRATEGIC treatment, since the principals in that treatment do not have a
reward decision, but see below for some estimates).
In the STRATEGIC treatment, principals’ behavior consistent with outcome-contingent play,
following strategies associated with OCP equilibria, is clearly prevalent. As anticipated by those
equilibria, the distribution of outcomes is centered at 4; 75% of observations fall within the range
between 3 and 5. Principals’ reward choices are systematically increasing in observed outcome. The
marginal effect of outcome on rate rewarded is .07 (.03, .11) in in-group matches and .10 (.06, .13)
in out-group matches.24 Further characterizing outcome-contingent play, we distinguish between
two distinct behavioral groups of principals: those whose bonus-awarding strategies are contingent
on the received outcomes (incentivizing principals in the context of the OCP equilibria) and those
whose strategies are not (non-incentivizing principals in the context of the ONCP equilibria). In-
centivizing principals constitute 76% of the principals in the STRATEGIC treatment. For each of
these principals, we compute the individual-specific threshold of outcome that minimize errors in
categorizing their respective reward decisions.25
The inferred principal-specific reward thresholds, whose distribution is given in Figure 1, vary
from 2 to 7. The average threshold in the STRATEGIC treatment is lower in in-group (3.93) than
in out-group matches (4.56), implying that incentivizing principals are less demanding in in-group
than in out-group matches; the significant difference in means is −.63 (−1.07,−.14; p < .01).26
24Marginal effects are estimated from the regression of reward decision shown in Table B.5 in
the appendix. 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals based on a subject-clustered bootstrap are
reported in parentheses throughout.
25The average share of reward decisions incorrectly classified by the error-minimizing threshold is
.19 suggesting that principals’ reward decisions are largely consistent with their inferred individual
thresholds.
26Figure B.1 provides the subject-level distribution of reward thresholds.
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Figure 1: Incentivizing principals’ reward thresholds by in-group status in the STRATEGIC treat-



















Our first result summarizes the preceding discussion:
Result 1 (Principals’ in-group bias in rewards) The bulk of principals in the STRATEGIC treat-
ment play incentivizing reward strategies. Among these incentivizing principals, significantly more
demand higher outcomes for rewarding out-group than in-group agents [supporting Hypothesis 1].
The comparison of the rates at which principals reward in in-group and in out-group matches
reinforces this result: the marginal effect of in-group status on principals’ rewards, holding outcome
at its mean, is .09 (.00, .20). We find differences in incentivizing principals’ reward rate in in- and
out-group matches above the reward threshold (.69 vs .77) as well as below it (.17 vs .22) with a
difference of .08 (.00, .17; p = .07) and .05 (−.01, .11; p = .08), respectively.
We next turn to describing the principals’ attribution decisions in STRATEGIC and NON-
STRATEGIC treatments to assess existence and degree of in-group bias in attribution to effort. To
fix concepts, let the in-group bias in attribution at outcome O, b(O) be the rate of attribution to
effort in in-group matches at O minus the rate of attribution to effort in out-group matches at O.
Different outcome thresholds in the 3-5 range are consistent with OCP equilibria that, in our model,
maximize the agents’ effort. This means that restricting attention to these equilibria, principals’
attribution decisions in the STRATEGIC treatment may be driven by attribution biases that would
be “canceling” each other at any exogenously fixed level of performance in that range. To get a
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valid measure of attribution bias, we need to evaluate attributions at the thresholds of good/bad
performance that are subject-specific. The reward threshold values computed above provide natural
individual-specific definitions of what outcomes a given principal perceives as good performance (at
and above the threshold) as opposed to bad performance (below the threshold).
The left and the middle panels of Figure 2 display in-group bias in attribution for in the
STRATEGIC treatment. Incentivizing principals attribute outcomes to effort more often in out-
group than in-group matches when the observed outcome is bad, at rates of .59 vs .51, respectively,
with a difference of .08 (−.02, .18; p = .11), but more often to effort in in-group than out-group
matches when the outcome is good, .56 vs .43, respectively, with a difference of .14 (.04, .25; p < .01).
Non-incentivizing principals (who always or never reward) attribute outcomes to effort in both in-
group and out-group matches at similar rates: .57 and .62 (the difference of .04 (−.09, .20) is not
systematically different from zero).
Figure 2: In-group bias in attribution to effort by outcome and treatment. Gray marker in NON-





































Bad outcome Good outcome
NON−STRATEGIC
Because of the nature of the NON-STRATEGIC treatment, we can identify neither who the
incentivizing principals are nor, endogenously, what constitutes good vs. bad outcomes in principals’
eyes. For this treatment, we estimate attribution bias drawing the line of “good” outcomes with
respect to the NON-STRATEGIC treatment at 5 (just above the median) or above, and “bad
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outcomes” at 3 (just below the median) or below.27 While this implies a limitation, the two sets of
cases that this demarcation creates are outside of “grey area,” and our confidence in the treatment
comparison with respect to these cases is particularly high. The black markers in the right panel
of Figure 2 show in-group bias in attribution, pooling all principals in the NON-STRATEGIC
treatment. In contrast to the STRATEGIC treatment, we do not observe a significant in-group
bias in attribution for the NON-STRATEGIC treatment, either when the principals observed bad
outcomes, .01 (−.16, .19), or when they observed good outcomes, −.03 (−.20, .15). The absolute
levels of attribution to effort in this treatment are .80 in the in-group and .79 in the out-group for
good outcomes and .48 in the in-group and .50 in the out-group for bad outcomes.28
Given that we cannot distinguish incentivizing from non-incentivizing principals in the NON-
STRATEGIC treatment, the estimate of in-group bias in attribution for the full set of principals
is averaging across two types of principals who, as our analysis of the STRATEGIC treatment
suggests, would behave differently in the strategic setting. Given this implicit averaging, it would
be reasonable to expect the resulting estimate of in-group bias in attribution to be lower than the
bias observed among incentivizing principals in the STRATEGIC treatment, simply due to “mixing-
in” of the non-incentivizing types, rather than due to differences in behavioral implications of the
two treatments.
The right sub-panel of Figure 2 shows a conservative estimate of in-group bias in attribution
for this treatment in gray – an estimate that is biased against finding the average treatment effect.
To arrive at this estimate, we look at the attribution decisions of the 76% most in-group biased
principals (in attribution choices) in the NON-STRATEGIC treatment – the share of incentiviz-
ing principals among all principals in the STRATEGIC treatment. Strikingly, we find that the
attribution bias at good outcomes among these (most biased) principals in the NON-STRATEGIC
treatments is still smaller than that among the incentivizing principals in the STRATEGIC treat-
ment.
27We have no clear expectation about whether a principal ought to perceive the median outcome
of 4 as good or bad.
28The attribution of an outcome to effort at a rate below .50 means, in effect, that the principal
was attributing the outcome to agent’s type more than to her effort.
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We summarize the preceding analysis in the following two results:
Result 2 (Principals’ own-identity-favoring attribution) In the STRATEGIC treatment, there ex-
ists a systematic attribution asymmetry between in- and out-group matches for the incentivizing
principals and no asymmetry for non-incentivizing principals [supporting Hypotheses 5b and 6].29
Result 3 (Strategic discrimination) Principals’ in-group favoring choices and the accompanying
asymmetric beliefs disappear in the NON-STRATEGIC environment [supporting hypothesis 7].
5.2 Agents’ choices and beliefs
Agents’ effort choices are decreasing with type, suggesting that agents are playing a pooling strategy
(consistent with our prior observation on the distribution of outcomes). The marginal effect of type
on effort is −.18 (−.25,−.10) in the STRATEGIC and −.52 (−.70,−.34) in the NON-STRATEGIC
treatment.30 The evidence shows no in-group bias in effort (i.e., a higher level of effort when matched
with an in-group principal than when matched with an out-group agent), on average. Agents in the
STRATEGIC treatment invest slightly more into effort in in-group than in out-group matches but
this average difference is small and not statistically significant: .05 (−.05, .15). This holds true at
every level of expected demand. We do not find a significant difference in the NON-STRATEGIC
treatment either, though the effort is somewhat lower in the in-group than in the out-group (the
difference is .06 (−.09, .21)). To summarize:
Result 4 In the aggregate, agents do not show in-group bias in effort either unconditionally nor
conditional on expected demands in either STRATEGIC or NON-STRATEGIC treatment [contrary
to Hypothesis 4b].
This result may suggest that agents are not strategically responding to principals’ identity-
contingent asymmetric rewarding. However, interpreting these average effort decisions is difficult
without anchoring agents’ choices in their beliefs about the principals similar to they way we an-
chored principals’ choices in their beliefs about the agents. Indeed, the average of agents’ effort
choices here is concealing a substantial variation in expected demands and, in consequence, in their
29B.3.1 in the appendix shows a more detailed discussion of the robustness of this result.
30Estimates are computed based on the regression reported in Table B.7 in the appendix.
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best responses to those beliefs. Agents’ aggregate beliefs in the STRATEGIC treatment about
principals’ biases are asymmetric (identity-match contingent), consistent with the overall direction
of bias in principals’ actual reward choices. The average difference in expected demands between
the in- and out-group matches, as elicited in the STRATEGIC treatment, is .10 (−.05, .24; p = .20)
indicating that the distribution of expected in-group bias in principals’ reward choices is somewhat
skewed (though not rising to conventional significance levels). Thus, we have the following result:
Result 5 Agents tend to believe that they face systematically lower outcome demand for a bonus
reward in in-group matches than in out-group matches [weakly supporting Hypothesis 2].
Figure 3: Predicted levels of effort plotted over expected in-group bias and expected demands for




























We next consider how agents respond to their expectations of principals’ demands, and provide
evidence of both perceived identity bias and agents’ identity-contingent responsiveness to that per-
ception. We begin with the observation about the expected demand effect : in both in- and out-group
matches, effort is increasing with expected demands. A one-unit increase in expected demands leads
to an average increase in effort of .20 (.10, .29) in in-group and .19 (.06, .31) in out-group matches.
This phenomenon can be seen in Figure 3. Panels A and B of the figure present predicted
values of effort as a function of agents’ expected demand and agents’ expectation of the principals’
in-group bias in rewards for in-group and out-group matches, respectively. Reading the heat-plots
from left to right, we clearly see the increase in effort (coloration becoming darker) with higher
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expected demand. However, as the expected bias increases (reading from bottom to top), the out-
group agents decrease (and in-group agents increase) their effort especially in the far right zones of
the maps, i.e., where the expected demands are highest.31
This is the evidence of agents’ expected bias effect : the difference in effort between in- and out-
group matches is increasing with agents’ expectation of the principals’ in-group bias in rewards. In
particular, when agents believe that to be rewarded, they are expected to deliver lower outcomes in
in- than out-group matches, their effort is predicted to be .14 (.02, .26) higher in in- than out-group
matches; when they believe higher outcome is required for reward in in- than out-group matches, the
difference estimate is −.08 (.04,−.20). Differences in effort choices are smallest for agents who do
not expect identity-contingent differences in principals’ demands. Note that the expected demand
effect and the expected bias effect work, on average, in opposite directions. While according to
the former, agents’ expectations of lower demands from in- than out-group principals should induce
higher effort in out- than in-group matches, such expectations lead, according to the latter, to higher
effort in in- than out-group matches.32
It is also noteworthy that for lower types, the sufficiently high demand leads to a decrease in
effort in out-group matches, pointing to a pattern of behavior that is illustrated by our motivating
example of Alice and Bob: expecting Bob’s demands may lead Alice to dis-invest if she perceives
those demands to be very high (more likely to occur in the out-group matches), and so the probability
of receiving a reward low, and expects the principals to be in-group biased. Indeed, agents who
expect high demands of 5 and above and higher demands from out-group than in-group principals,
choose levels of effort that are .39 (−.35, .96) lower in out-group than in-group matches. However,
for the bulk of the data, the expected demand in out-group matches is below such levels, and the
average overall effect is the increase in effort, as depicted in the figure.
31More evidence supporting this claim is provided in Figure B.6 in the appendix. Local regressions
show that the expected demand effect is significant and positive when estimated sub-setting agents
by expected bias while the expected bias effect only is significant and positive for agents with
expected demand 4 and above (See Tables B.9 and B.10).
32In Section B.3.2 of the appendix, we show that both the expected demand effect and the
expected bias effect increase with agents’ risk-aversion.
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Properly accounting for the levels of (and differences in) expected demands, thus, both explains
the aggregate-level finding of no difference between agents’ behavior in in- and out-group matches
and corrects the mistaken impression in may convey. The following result summarizes the above
discussion and presents our key substantive conclusions on agents’ effort choices:
Result 6 Agents’ choices display an expected demand effect as well as an expected bias effect in in-
and out-group matches [supporting Hypotheses 3 and 4b].
5.3 Linking principals’ and agents’ choices and beliefs
Our key results show that principals’ choices and judgments are systematically group-dependent
and that agents anticipate and respond to that dependence. But are the principals’ attributions
ultimately correct in their assessments of the agents’ decisions? As the evidence of a robust expected
demand effect in agents’ choices suggests, agents respond to higher expectation (in this case, in out-
group matches) by increasing their effort to meet the demand (see Section 5.2). Even if agents’
choices are subject to the expected bias effect, if they expect the demands in the out-group matches
to be sufficiently high relative to the in-group demands, the expected demand effect may override
the expected bias effect, producing a higher, not lower, effort in the out-group matches. Our
regression-based estimate of agents’ effort reinforces this conclusion. When the agents expect to be
facing symmetric demands from in- and out-group principals, they choose higher effort in in-group
matches (the difference is .14 (−.09, .37) in favor of the in-group), but the sign of the difference flips
if the agents expect to meet higher demands in the out-group match: expecting that the principals’
demand is two outcome points higher in out- than in-group matches increases the difference between
average effort in out-group and in-group matches to .27 (−.70, .17).33
Whether the in-group bias in rewards and the in-group bias in attribution can be made strate-
gically consistent is, thus, a function of the size of the reward bias and the assumptions we make
about the agents’ corresponding beliefs. A natural such assumption for the purposes of this as-
sessment is that a principal’s reward bias is (counterfactually) the object of a common conjecture
with the agents. With this assumption, then, we can ask whether the principals’ attribution de-
cisions are correct if the agents correctly anticipate principals’ reward biases. When the reward
33Estimates are based on Model 4 in Table B.8 in the appendix.
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bias is relatively small, the two biases are mutually consistent. As the in-group rewards bias (and
its expectation on the part of the agents) grows, the principals should be expecting the size of the
expected demand effect increasingly to counter the size of the expected bias effect; as this occurs,
the persistent in-group bias in attribution becomes evidence of the principals’ under-appreciation
of the force of the expected demand effect. Indeed, we find that, while agents’ average effort clearly
increases with expected demands by the principals (Figure 3), principals’ attribution of good out-
comes to effort, on average, does not increase with their demands. The marginal effect of principals’
reward threshold on the attribution to effort is −.05 (−.14, .03) in in-group and −.02 (−.11, .07) in
out-group matches for incentivizing principals who are in-group biased in their reward decision.34
We summarize the preceding in the following result:
Result 7 Principals’ attribution decisions suggest a systematic underestimate of the positive influ-
ence of the expected demand effect on the out-group agents’ effort choices.
6 Discussion: interpreting the evidence
In the evidence on the discriminatory behavior we present, the principals’ identity-contingent attri-
bution choices reflect their expectations about agents’ effort choices, which, in turn, are responding
to expectations of the principals’ reward choices. Consistent with the idea of strategic discrimina-
tion, the contrast between the STRATEGIC and NON-STRATEGIC treatments suggests that the
effect of the strategic relationship in an identity-salient context is to create asymmetric behavioral
expectations associated with the information entailed in the identity markers.
What is the source of that information? One plausible source is a norm of mutual reciprocity
that may correspond to an equilibrium of a different game – played outside the lab – in which
identity-indexed interactions are repeated and the mutual in-group favoritism (reciprocity) is the
focal equilibrium. Such an equilibrium may motivate subjects’ interpretations of the proper be-
havior in social identity contexts, and the principals’ attribution choices would be understood as
encapsulating the expectation that comes with that norm. This possibility would still be consistent
34Estimates are taken from a regression of attribution to effort on outcome, in-group status of
the matched principal, principals’ individual reward threshold, the interaction of these variables,
and round of play.
30
with a distinctly strategic account of the evidence of discrimination we describe, even if it would be
driven in the first place by the equilibrium beliefs induced outside, rather than inside, the lab.
Yet, it’s important not to overweight the force of reciprocity as the explanatory account. The
contrast between the attribution asymmetries in the STRATEGIC and the absence of such asymme-
tries in the NON-STRATEGIC treatment casts doubt on reciprocity, or at least on the reciprocity
that is taken to be independent of the strategic properties of the proximate interactions (such as, for
example, those that were instantiated in the lab). Even if the reward choices were somehow based
on expectations of reciprocity, it is clear that attribution choices are responding to features of that
proximate environment rather than being driven by considerations from outside the lab. The same
evidence also suggests that the discriminatory behavior we report is unlikely to be driven by a “taste
for discrimination,” even one that may be entailed in internalized identity-contingent reciprocity.
The “taste for discrimination” mechanism suggests more instinctive, less well-considered behavior
than the behavior that is contingent on the presence of a strategic relationship.
A different piece of evidence, from exit surveys following our STRATEGIC treatment, rein-
forces the view that the discriminatory judgments we document are well-considered and that their
authors are self-aware. In the survey, we asked questions that allow us to evaluate the relation-
ship between subjects’ self-awareness and their choices in the experiment. In their responses, 44%
of incentivizing principals indicate that they were influenced in their reward decision by the group
membership of their matched agent, in contrast to no non-incentivizing principals’ saying that group
identities mattered. The contrast with respect to the attribution decision is less stark but still sig-
nificant: 35% of incentivizing principals claimed to be influenced by group membership in their
attribution choices compared to only 23% of principals who always or never rewarded. Further,
within the set of incentivizing principals, awareness of one’s own bias in reward decisions increases
attribution of good outcomes to effort in in-group in contrast to out-group matches. For those who
are aware of their reward biases, the in-group bias in the attribution of good outcomes to effort is
.27 (.06, .49) in contrast to .14 (−.03, .30) for those who admit no such awareness. In sum, principals
whose reward and attribution choices are asymmetric tend to be aware of it.
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7 Conclusion
Our analysis has provided a behavioral evaluation of strategic discrimination – an important contrib-
utor to identity-based discrimination that has resisted clean identification and systematic analysis
in previous work.
The results we presented have a number of implications. As a descriptive matter, the evidence
of strategic discrimination suggests, first, that the existing measures of prejudice in the observa-
tional studies may be partial-equilibrium: they may be identifying a joint measure of prejudice
and rational expectations associated with an equilibrium performance, rather than prejudice alone.
But the measurement problem is subtle and points to the importance of laboratory-based research
designs: given the strategic incentives we identify, prejudiced principals may be observationally
indistinguishable from unprejudiced ones, and, facing either of them, agents who do not share their
principals’ salient social identity would be equally justified in expecting to be treated more harshly
than their colleagues who do share it, and so, would also be justified in reducing effort in anticipa-
tion of the lower likelihood of receiving deserved recognition. And second, the disjunction between
the aggregate-level evidence of discrimination and gaps in pay and promotion, on one hand, and
of the rare successes of the complaints of discrimination at the individual-case level, on the other,
may be indicative of discrimination as a strategic phenomenon. In such discrimination, principals’
behavior may be consistent with actual differences in agents’ contributions – yet those differences
are endogenous to the expectation of discriminatory behavior from the principals, and, our evidence
suggests, principals tend to under-appreciate the effort from the out-group agents (or, equivalently,
out-group agents may be justified in reducing their effort still farther than they, in fact, do). The
bottom line, though, is that strategically induced attribution asymmetries may be a, if not the,
first-order phenomenon when it comes to accounting for discriminatory choices by principals, and,
as such, need to be addressed in both positive studies of discrimination and in policy design.
With an eye toward normative considerations related to policy design, the most immediate ob-
servation is that, given the history of discrimination in the world outside the lab, the expected result
of strategic discrimination is, probably, the persistence of the familiar asymmetric pattern, with the
memes associated with strategically reinforced beliefs systematically undermining the historically
underprivileged groups as surely as does well-ingrained prejudice. Recognizing the sources of dis-
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crimination may, however, help in properly calibrating anti-discrimination policies. A broad policy
implication of our analysis is that reactive, discrimination-penalizing policies may be insufficient for
defeating discrimination. More effective solutions should look to influence the formation of beliefs
that support the asymmetric identity-based strategic responses – from affirmative-action policies at
the managerial level (for which our analysis of strategic discrimination provides an efficiency-based
rationale) to oversight schemes that suppress information about group identities (of agents, but no
less importantly, also of principals), and reward agents strictly on observable measures of perfor-
mance without conditioning on principals’ beliefs of their causes. We leave the closer behavioral
analysis of these and other institutional solutions to future work.
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A Experimental design appendix
A.1 Treatments
We implement four treatments within the research agenda: the main – STRATEGIC – treatment
features induced groups and the opportunity to reward the agent with a bonus (henceforth, referred
to as the availability of the sanctioning device), following closely the model described above. The
NON-IDENTITY treatment does not induce group identities, and the NON-STRATEGIC treatment
induces identities but removes the sanctioning device. The NON-STRATEGIC/NON-IDENTITY
treatment features neither induced identities nor the sanctioning device.
Our experiment included 202 subjects, 101 in the role of a principal and 101 in the role of an agent,
generating 4040 subject-round observations in 11 sessions (see Table A.1).





(N=110, n=2200) (N=38, n=760)
Without sanctioning
NON-STRATEGIC NON-STRATEGIC/NON-IDENTITY
(N=40, n=800) (N=14, n=280)
A.2 Setup
Sessions were carried out at the Center for Experimental Social Sciences/NYU. Each experimental
session lasted 20 rounds with 14-22 participating subjects. Participants signed up via a web-based
recruitment system that draws on a large, pre-existing pool of potential subjects. Subjects were not
recruited from the authors’ courses. The recruitment system contains a filter that blocked subjects
from participating in more than one session of a given experiment. The subject pool consists
almost entirely of undergraduates from around the university. Subjects interacted anonymously via
networked computers. The experiments were programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007).
After giving informed consent according to standard human subjects protocols, subjects received
written instructions that were subsequently read aloud in order to promote understanding and
induce common knowledge of the experimental protocol. No deception was employed at any point
in the experiment, in accordance with the long-standing norms of the lab in which the experiment
was carried out. Before the principal-agent game stage commenced, subjects were asked three
questions concerning their understanding of the payoff tables provided to them in the instructions.
90% of participating subjects answered those questions correctly. At the end of the experiment, an
exit survey was conducted.
In communicating the game to the subjects we referred to type as “Special Number,” to noise
as “Random Bump,” to outcome as the “Choice Outcome”, to subjects in the role of agents as
“Player 1,” and to subjects in the role of principals as “Player 2”; the value generated by principal’s
decision whether to double type or effort in the outcome-function was termed “Increased Outcome.”
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Subjects did not see agent’s payoff function but received a table of all possible payoffs given type,
effort, and noise, and the principal’s reward decision, and in the instructions were told:
“When you are participating in the role of Player 1, your payoff in a given round
will depend on the choice outcome in that round (and so indirectly, on your special
number, your effort level, and the realised random bump) but also directly on the
chosen level of effort and on the decision of Player 2 you are matched with whether
to give you a bonus.”
A.3 Group identity inducement
At the beginning of each session of both the STRATEGIC and the NON-STRATEGIC treatments,
subjects were shown 5 pairs of paintings, with one painting by Paul Klee paired with one by Vassily
Kandinsky, and were asked which painting they prefer in each pair. Based on which painter a
subject preferred in a majority of pairs, he/she was assigned to be a Klee or a Kandinsky.
The STRATEGIC treatment condition generated 55 Klees (subjects who preferred paintings by
Paul Klee most of the time) and 55 Kandinskys (subjects who preferred those by Vassily Kandinsky
most of the time). In the NON-STRATEGIC treatment there were 21 Klees and 19 Kandinskys.
Once identities were assigned, subjects participated in an activity aimed at strengthening the at-
tachment to the new identities. In particular, they were given a quiz in which they were asked to
identify the painter (Klee or Kandinsky) of five further paintings. In answering the question about
each of those paintings, subjects gave initial guesses which were made available to other subjects in
the same identity group before everyone was asked for their final answer. Subjects within a group
received $1 if the majority of members of their group named the correct painter in the final answer.
Additionally, they received another $1 when members of their group gave at least as many correct
final answers on all five quizzes as members of the other group.
During the quiz, a majority of members in both groups gave correct answers in four out of five
painting quizzes. Ultimately, all subjects received a payoff of $5 at this stage of the experiment.
This positive group experience in a competitive environment is part of the intended group-identity
strengthening; the experimenters intentionally selected paintings whose authors are moderately easy
to identify. Subjects were told how many correct answers their group gave and were notified that
members of their group “gave at least as many correct answers” as members of the other group.




During the following experiment, we require your complete undivided attention and ask that you
follow instructions carefully. Please turn off your cell phones and, for the duration of the exper-
iment, do not take actions that could distract you or other participants, including opening other
applications on your computer, reading books, newspapers, and doing homework.
This is an experiment on group decision-making. In this experiment you will make a series of choices.
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid depending on the specific choices that you made
during the experiment and the choices made by other participants. If you follow the instructions
39
and make appropriate decisions, you may make an appreciable amount of money.
This experiment has 3 parts. Your total earnings will be the sum of your payoffs in each part plus
the show-up fee. We will start with a brief instruction period, followed by Part 1 of the experiment.
After Part 1 is completed, we will pause to receive instructions for Part 2 and complete the session
accordingly.
If you have questions during the instruction period, please raise your hand after I have completed
reading the instructions, and your questions will be answered out loud so everyone can hear. Please
restrict these questions to clarifications about the instructions only. If you have any questions after
the paid session of the experiment has begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and
assist you. Apart from the questions directed to the experimenter, you are expressly asked to refrain
from communicating with other participants in the experiment, including making public remarks
or exclamations. Failure to comply with these instructions will result in the termination of your
participation and the forfeiture of any compensation.
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Part 1
In Part 1 of the experiment, everyone will be shown 5 pairs of paintings by two artists, Paul Klee
and Wassily Kandinsky. You will be asked to choose which painting in each pair you prefer. You
will then be classified as member of the “KLEEs” (or “a KLEE” as a shorthand) or member of the
“KANDINSKYs” (or “a KANDINSKY” as a shorthand) based on which artist you prefer most and
informed privately about your classification. Everyone’s identity as a KLEE or as a KANDINSKY
will stay fixed for the rest of the experiment (that is, in both Part 1 and Part 2 of the experiment).
You will then be asked to identify the painter (Klee or Kandinsky) of five other paintings. For
each of those paintings, you will be asked to submit two answers: your initial guess and your final
answer. After submitting your initial guess, you will have an opportunity to see the initial guesses
of your fellow KLEEs if you are a KLEE, or of fellow KANDINSKYs if you are a KANDINSKY,
and then also an opportunity to change your answer when you are submitting your final answer.
If you are a KLEE and a half or more of KLEEs give a correct final answer then, regardless of
whether your own final answer was correct or incorrect, you and each of your fellow KLEEs will re-
ceive $1. Similarly, if you are a member of the KANDINSKYs and a half or more of KANDINSKYs
give a correct final answer then, regardless of your own final answer, each of the KANDINSKYs,
including you, will receive $1. However, if you are a KLEE and more than a half of KLEEs give an
incorrect final answer, then, regardless of whether your own final answer was correct or incorrect,
you and each of the KLEEs will receive $0. And similarly, if you are a KANDINSKY and the final
answers from more than a half of KANDINSKYs were incorrect, then you and each of your fellow
KANDINSKYs will receive $0 regardless of what answer he or a she gave personally.
In addition, if you and your fellow group members answer at least as many quiz questions correctly
than members of the other group, you will receive an additional payoff of $1. That is, if you are
a KLEE and you and your fellow KLEEs give more correct answers than the KANDINSKYs, you
receive the additional payoff. If you are a KANDINSKY and you and your fellow KANDINSKYs
give more correct answers than the KLEEs, you receive the additional payoff.




We will now move on to Part 2 of the experiment. Part 2 will consist of 20 different rounds. At the
beginning of the first round, you will be randomly assigned a role of either Player 1 or Player 2. You
will keep that role for the rest of Part 3 of the experiment. Throughout this part of the experiment,
you will also retain your identity as a member of the KLEEs or a member of the KANDINSKYs,
as assigned in Part 2 of the experiment.
Matched group
In each round, all participants in the experiment will be randomly matched into pairs, each con-
sisting of one Player 1 and one Player 2. Because every participant will be randomly re-matched
with other participants into a different group in each round of the experiment, the composition of
matched pairs will vary from one round to the next. All of participants’ interactions will take place
anonymously through a computer terminal, so your true personal identity will never be revealed
to others, and you will not know who precisely is in your pair in any round of the experiment.
However, every time you are matched with another participant (Player 1 or Player 2), you will be
told whether that participant is a member of the KLEEs or a member of the KANDINSKYs.
In each round, a member of the group who takes on the role of Player 1 in that round will be
randomly assigned a number, which we will refer to as Player 1’s special number. That number will
be shown only to that participant and never to other participants in the experiment. You should
know, however, that Player 1’s special number is one of three possible numbers: 1, 2 or, 3, and is
chosen by the computer for assigning to Player 1 so that each of these numbers is equally likely to
be picked. In each round, Player 1 is assigned a new special number, which stays fixed until the
round ends, at which point a new special number is assigned. As with all other players, her identity
as a member of the KLEEs or a member of the KANDINSKYs does not change from one round to
the next.
Choices within each round of the experiment
At the beginning of each round, in each group, the member who is designated as Player 1 will choose
a number: 1, 2, or 3, which you can think of as Player 1’s level of effort. Please note that, while
Player 1’s effort is her choice, Player 1’s special number is not her choice, but is assigned to Player
1 by the computer. Player 1’s choice of effort will help determine the choice outcome in that round.
In particular, the choice outcome will be computed as follows:
the choice outcome = Player 1’s effort + Player 1’s special number + random bump,
where the possible values of the random bump are -1, 0, or 1, and any one of these three values will
be possible and equally likely to occur.
For example, suppose that a given Player 1’s special number is 2, he or she chooses a level of effort
equal to 1, and the realised value of the random bump is -1. Then the choice outcome is 2 + 1 - 1 = 2.
After the choice outcome is computed, it will be shown to Player 2. However, Player 2 will not see
Player 1’s special number nor her choice of effort nor the realised value of the random bump.
After seeing the choice outcome, Player 2 will be given an opportunity to increase the outcome by
doubling the contribution to outcome of either Player 1’s effort or of her special number – whichever
of those two Player 2 decides to increase. A new outcome will, then, be computed, based on the
corresponding choice outcome, but now increased because of the doubled contribution of effort or
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special number, as indicated by Player 2. We will refer to this new resulting outcome as the increased
outcome.
For example, suppose that a given Player 1’s special number is 2, he or she chooses a level of effort
equal to 1, and the realised random bump is -1. Suppose, further, that Player 2 decides to increase
the outcome by raising the contribution of effort. Then the increased outcome is 2 + [2(1)] - 1 =
3. (Note that the product in the square brackets [] is the newly increased value of effort.) If, in
contrast, Player 2 decides to raise the contribution of Player 1’s special number, then the increased
outcome is [2(2)] + 1 - 1 = 4. (Note that the product in the square brackets [] is now the newly
increased contribution of Player 1’s special number.)
Of course, if Player 1 had chosen a level of effort equal to 3, instead, then, with her special number
(2) and the realised random bump (-1), the choice outcome would be 1 + 3 - 1 = 3. If Player 2 had
further chosen to increase the outcome by increasing the contribution of Player 1’s special number,
then the increased outcome would be 2(1) + 3 - 1 = 4. But if Player 2 had chosen to increase the
contribution of Player 1’s effort, then the increased outcome would be 1 + 2(3) - 1 = 6.
In addition to deciding how to increase the choice outcome, Player 2 also decides if she wants to
give Player 1 a bonus - a special addition to Player 1’s payoff in that round.
After the increased outcome is shown to Player 2 and Player 2’s bonus decision is shown to Player
1, the round ends and the players proceed to the next round.
This completes the description of a single round of play. I will now describe how your payoff for the
experiment will be calculated.
Payoffs
If you are participating in the role of Player 1, your payoff in a given round will depend on the
choice outcome in that round (and so indirectly, on your special number, your effort level, and the
realised random bump) but also directly on the chosen level of effort and on the decision of Player
2 you are matched with whether to give you a bonus.
Please look now at Table 1 on page 9 of these instructions. This table gives you the values of Player
1’s payoffs for all possible values of your special number, your effort level, and the realised random
bump. For your convenience we are reproducing a piece of this table in the text of these instructions.
Please, turn back to page 6 of the instructions.
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Special Random
Number Effort Bump Outcome Bonus No Bonus
1
1
-1 1 6.54 4.05
0 2 8.44 6.54
1 3 10.05 8.44
2
-1 2 6.49 4.59
0 3 8.10 6.49
1 4 9.52 8.10
3
-1 3 6.15 4.54
0 4 7.57 6.15
1 5 8.85 7.57
Suppose, for example, that in a given round, your special number was 1, your effort was 2, and
the random bump was -1. You can see in the table above that the resulting choice outcome is 2.
Suppose that Player 2 decided not to give you a bonus this round. You will find your payoff for this
example by finding special number equal to 1 in the left-most column, effort equal to 2 in the column
second from the left, and random bump equal to -1 in the third column from the left. Then, you
will see in the right-most column of this row of Table 1 that your payoff for that round will be $4.59.
Suppose, however, that you are considering a higher level of effort, say 3. If the random bump
happens to be same, -1, then the outcome will be 3. If the Player 2 decides to give you a bonus in
this case, then your payoff in this round can be found by locating special number equal to 1 in the
left-most column, effort equal to 3 in the second column from the left, random bump equal to -1,
and then looking at the second to last column of this row, which shows a payoff of $6.15.
To give you further assistance in visualizing your choices as Player 1, we will also provide you the
relevant payoff information on the screen as you are making your effort choices. This information
will be equivalent to what you see in Table 1. Please look now at page 8 of this handout, which
reproduces a screenshot similar to what you will see each round. The screenshot shows a question
that we will ask Player 1 as a part of his effort choice: “What minimal outcome do you think Player
2 will demand to give you a bonus?” Then, for a given such outcome that you are specifying, the
screen will show you what payoffs you may get with what probabilities (corresponding to different
random bumps) given different available choices of effort.
If you are participating in the role of Player 2, your payoff in a given round will be equal to the
increased outcome you obtained in that round – that is, it will depend on the choice outcome pro-
duced by Player 1 you are matched with (and so on Player 1’s special number, her choice of effort,
and the realised random bump), as well as on your decision on how to increase it.
Please look now at Table 2 on page 10 of the instructions where you can see how Player 2’s payoffs
are computed from the choice outcome and Player 2’s decision how to increase it. Now, for example,
suppose that in a given round, Player 1’s special number was 2, she chose a level of effort equal to
1, and the value of the random bump was -1. If you chose to increase the outcome by increasing
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effort, then your payoff in that round is
2 + [2× 1]− 1 = $3
In contrast, if you chose to increase the outcome by increasing Player 1’s special number, then your
payoff in that round is
[2× 2] + 1− 1 = $4
You will see this by finding special number equal to 2 in the left-most column, effort equal to 1 in
the second column from the left, and random bump equal to -1 in the third column from the left.
The value in the same wow of the next column shows that the the choice outcome associated with
this example is 2. The values in this row in the two columns on the right, then, tell you what the
increased outcome and thus your payoff from this round as Player 2 will be. In case you decide to
double special number, your payoff will be 4. In case you decide to increase effort, your payoff will
be 3.
Again, your total payoff for the experiment will be the two highest round payoff from three ran-
domly chosen rounds plus your payoffs from Part 1 of the experiment plus the show-up fee of $7.
If you have any questions, please ask them now.
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Figure A.1: Screen shot of agents’ belief elicitation and effort decision in the STRATEGIC treat-
ment. Screen shot was embedded as Figure 1 on page 8 of the instructions given to subjects.
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Table 1: Player 1’s round payoff
Special Random
Number Effort Bump Outcome Bonus No Bonus
1
1
-1 1 6.54 4.05
0 2 8.44 6.54
1 3 10.05 8.44
2
-1 2 6.49 4.59
0 3 8.10 6.49
1 4 9.52 8.10
3
-1 3 6.15 4.54
0 4 7.57 6.15
1 5 8.85 7.57
2
1
-1 2 8.44 6.54
0 3 10.05 8.44
1 4 11.47 10.05
2
-1 3 8.10 6.49
0 4 9.52 8.10
1 5 10.80 9.52
3
-1 4 7.57 6.15
0 5 8.85 7.57
1 6 10.02 8.85
3
1
-1 3 10.05 8.44
0 4 11.47 10.05
1 5 12.57 11.47
2
-1 4 9.52 8.10
0 5 10.80 9.52
1 6 11.97 10.80
3
-1 5 8.85 7.57
0 6 10.02 8.85
1 7 11.12 10.02
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Special Random Number Effort
Number Effort Bump Outcome Doubled Doubled
1
1
-1 1 2 2
0 2 3 3
1 3 4 4
2
-1 2 3 4
0 3 4 5
1 4 5 6
3
-1 3 4 6
0 4 5 7
1 5 6 8
2
1
-1 2 4 3
0 3 5 4
1 4 6 5
2
-1 3 5 5
0 4 6 6
1 5 7 7
3
-1 4 6 7
0 5 7 8
1 6 8 9
3
1
-1 3 6 4
0 4 7 5
1 5 8 6
2
-1 4 7 6
0 5 8 7
1 6 9 8
3
-1 5 8 8
0 6 9 9
1 7 10 10
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Table B.1: Number of subjects and number of observations by treatment.













The STRATEGIC treatment condition generated 55 Klees (subjects who preferred paintings by
Paul Klee most of the time) and 55 Kandinskys (subjects who preferred those by Vassily Kandinsky
most of the time). In the NON-STRATEGIC treatment there were 21 Klees and 19 Kandinskys.
During the quiz, a majority of members in both groups gave correct answers in four out of five
painting quizzes. Ultimately, all subjects received a payoff of $5 at this stage of the experiment.
This positive group experience in a competitive environment is part of the intended group-identity
strengthening; the experimenters intentionally selected paintings whose authors are moderately easy
to identify. Subjects were told how many correct answers their group gave and were notified that
members of their group “gave at least as many correct answers” as members of the other group.
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B.2 Summary statistics
Table B.2: Means (standard deviation), minimum, and maximum values of type, effort, outcome,
attribution decision (0 = attributed to type, 1 = attributed to effort), and reward decision (0 = not




Variable In-group Out-group In-group Out-group Min Max
Type 1.97 (.82) 2.01 (.80) 2.01 (.81) 2.00 (.79) 2.05 (.79) 1 3
Effort 1.79 (.78) 1.74 (.79) 1.76 (.84) 2.11 (.77) 2.17 (.76) 1 3
Expected demand 3.38 (1.2) 3.48 (1.3) 3.77 (1.4) 1 7
Outcome 3.70 (1.3) 3.68 (1.3) 3.81 (1.3) 4.03 (1.1) 4.14 (1.2) 1 7
Attribution .555 (.50) .534 (.50) .455 (.50) .66 (.48) .57 (.50) 0 1
Reward .594 (.49) .483 (.50) .605 (.49) - - 0 1
Table B.3: Rates of principals’ decisions to award a bonus (reward decision) and principals’ attri-
bution of good/bad outcomes to effort (attribution decision). We do not observe reward decisions
in the NON-STRATEGIC and NON-STRATEGIC/NON-IDENTITY treatments. The reward rate
of non-incentivizing principals would be the average over the reward rate of those who always award
a bonus (rate of 1) and those who never do so (rate of 0) and is therefore omitted.
Treatment Incentivizer Outcome Match rewarded attribution
STRATEGIC Yes Bad In-group 0.220 (0.415) 0.505 (0.501)
Out-group 0.165 (0.372) 0.585 (0.494)
Good In-group 0.770 (0.422) 0.561 (0.497)
Out-group 0.691 (0.463) 0.426 (0.496)
No - In-group - 0.618 (0.488)
- Out-group - 0.573 (0.497)
NON-STRATEGIC - Bad In-group - 0.803 (0.497)
- Out-group - 0.794 (0.401)
- Good In-group - 0.478 (0.408)
- Out-group - 0.507 (0.503)
NON-IDENTITY Yes Bad - 0.165 (0.373) 0.441 (0.498)
Good - 0.742 (0.440) 0.484 (0.502)
No - - - 0.450 (0.499)
NON-STRATEGIC - Bad - - 0.767 (0.427)
/NON-IDENTITY - Good - - 0.694 (0.466)
51
Table B.4: Means of agents’ effort choices (effort decision) and agents’ expected demand belief.
Treatment Match type effort expected demand
STRATEGIC In-group 1 1.99 (0.100)
 3.38 (1.21)2 1.74 (0.089)
3 1.62 (0.095)
Out-group 1 1.91 (0.097)
 3.48 (1.31)2 1.73 (0.097)
3 1.58 (0.086)
NON-STRATEGIC In-group 1 2.69 (0.094)
2 2.05 (0.119)
3 1.61 (0.180)
Out-group 1 2.74 (0.092)
2 2.12 (0.116)
3 1.74 (0.154)
NON-IDENTITY - 1 2.05 (0.153)
 3.77 (1.26)- 2 1.74 (0.151)
- 3 1.48 (0.162)
NON-STRATEGIC - 1 2.72 (0.)
/NON-IDENTITY - 2 2.09 (0.)
- 3 1.34 (0.)
B.3 Robustness and further statistical analysis
B.3.1 Principals’ choices and beliefs
We estimate the incentivizing principals’ individual reward thresholds from choices in 20 rounds by
each principal. Apart from the overall tendency towards in-group biased reward choices, we find
that, at the individual-level, more principals can be characterized by a reward threshold that is
significantly different from zero in the direction of in-group bias. In particular, 8 principals feature
significant positive in-group bias in reward thresholds (see Figure B.1) while only 3 principals show
significant negative in-group bias in reward thresholds.
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Figure B.1: Distribution of incentivizing principals’ reward thresholds in the STRATEGIC treat-
ment. 95% confidence intervals estimated by an individual-level bootstrap of the threshold compu-
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50% of incentivizing principals are classified by our measure as demanding to see lower outcomes
from the in-group than from the out-group agents (henceforth: as being “in-group biased in re-
wards”), while a significantly smaller share, 20%, are classified as demanding the reverse. We can
reject the hypotheses that the prevalence of in-group biased principals in our sample is driven by
chance; and that the distribution of statistically significant individual-level in-group bias is a chance
overestimate, but cannot reject the corresponding hypothesis with respect to out-group bias.
Further, at the aggregate level, the distribution of in-group bias in reward thresholds is significantly
skewed towards positive bias; the appropriate one-sample t-test (p < .01), sign-test (p = .01), and
sign rank-test (p = .01) all support the interpretation that incentivizing principals are more likely to
be significantly in-group bias in reward thresholds than not biased at all or biased towards the out-
group. Running a randomization test that generates 10000 samples of 20 reward decisions of the 42
incentivizing principals (where reward decisions are modelled according to the regression estimates
in for the STRATEGIC treatment shown in Table B.5), yields that we should expect at most 26
principals with positive in-group bias and no fewer than 8 principals with negative in-group bias in
a world where reward choices are random and not contingent on group identity. More precisely, only
in 1 out of 10000 random samples do we find that the number of out-group biased principals is 8 or
fewer and, at the same time, the number out in-group bias principals is at least 21. Formulating a
hypothesis test based on the implied simulated null distribution, we find that the observed pattern
of in-group bias in reward thresholds cannot have occurred by chance (p < .01).
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Table B.5: Principals’ reward decisions regressed on outcome, in-group status of the matched agent,













Standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
How should we think about a principal’s bias more generally across outcomes? We cannot measure
it for the incentivizing principals by simply comparing average attribution choices above and below
the good outcome thresholds in in-group and out-group matches because the sets of good outcomes
tend to be different in those matches (In contrast, because those sets are the same for the non-
incentivizing principals, that comparison is the right measure of their group-specific bias.)
An incentivizing principal who is willing to reward in-group agents for lower outcomes than out-
group agents may appear to be more likely to attribute good outcomes to effort in the in-group
than in the out-group matches but may, in fact, be group-neutral in attribution at a fixed level of
outcome. Avoiding the confounding effects of differences in good outcome thresholds by measuring
in-group bias in attribution at the level of the individual principal would be problematic because,
for a particular subject, a given good outcome in the in-group matches may not have an equivalent
outcome in the out-group matches, and certainly does not have an equivalent bad outcome.
We get around this problem by making inferences based on the behavior in in-group and out-
group matches of comparable principals, pooling together principals who show similar biases in
reward decisions. We estimate principals’ attribution choices in a regression framework to assess
the robustness of results on principals’ in-group bias in attribution in relation to their in-group bias
in rewards at a given level of outcome.
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Table B.6: Logistic regression of incentivizing principals’ attribution decision on covariates in the
STRATEGIC treatment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
good outcome -0.21 (0.14) -0.22 (0.14) -0.67 (0.21)∗∗ -0.59 (0.21)∗∗ -0.53 (0.22)∗ -0.38 (0.25) -0.33 (0.27)
in-group 0.08 (0.14) -0.31 (0.19) -0.25 (0.20) -0.19 (0.21) -0.23 (0.24) -0.23 (0.24)
good.outcome × in-group 0.85 (0.28)∗∗ 0.71 (0.30)∗ 0.62 (0.31)∗ 0.53 (0.35) 0.53 (0.35)
in-group bias in rewards 0.09 (0.06) 0.15 (0.10)
good outcome × in-group bias in rewards -0.18 (0.18)
in-group × in-group bias in rewards -0.11 (0.16)
good outcome × in-group × in-group bias in rewards 0.24 (0.24)
in-group bias in rewards2 0.10 (0.04)∗ 0.10 (0.04)∗
good outcome × in-group bias in rewards2 -0.12 (0.09) -0.12 (0.09)
in-group × in-group bias in rewards2 0.03 (0.09) 0.03 (0.09)
good outcome × in-group × in-group bias in rewards2 0.07 (0.13) 0.07 (0.13)
outcome -0.03 (0.07)
round -0.04 (0.01)∗∗ -0.04 (0.01)∗∗ -0.03 (0.01)∗∗ -0.03 (0.01)∗∗ -0.03 (0.01)∗∗ -0.04 (0.01)∗∗ -0.04 (0.01)∗∗
constant 0.59 (0.16)∗∗∗ 0.55 (0.18)∗∗ 0.72 (0.19)∗∗∗ 0.64 (0.19)∗∗∗ 0.59 (0.20)∗∗ 0.47 (0.21)∗ 0.56 (0.29)
AIC 1157.55 1159.24 1152.27 1151.57 1156.43 1146.35 1148.15
BIC 1171.75 1178.17 1175.94 1179.98 1199.03 1188.95 1195.48
Log Likelihood -575.77 -575.62 -571.13 -569.79 -569.22 -564.18 -564.07
Deviance 1151.55 1151.24 1142.27 1139.57 1138.43 1128.35 1128.15
Observations 840 840 840 840 840 840 840
Subjects 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
To this end, Figure B.2 is based on the results from a regression of attribution to effort on in-group
status of the matched agent, whether an outcome is below or above the threshold (whether an
outcome is a bad or good outcome) for each level of in-group bias in rewards, the particular outcome
observed, as well as covariates. Based on the regression estimates we generate the marginal effect of
in-group vs. out-group status of the agent on attribution (= in-group bias in attribution) of good
and bad outcomes over principals in-group bias in rewards (markers). We also superimpose a curve
of lowess estimates of the directly observed average of in-group bias in attribution for each level of
principals’ in-group bias in rewards for good and bad outcomes (dashed lines). Estimates are taken
from Model 7 for incentivizing principals in Table B.6. Informed by an U-shaped curve drawn by
the lowess estimator of average in-group bias in attribution, we fit a model that includes the square
of in-group bias in rewards.
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Figure B.2: Average difference in the rates of attribution to effort between in-group and out-group
matches (= in-group bias in attribution) over in-group bias in rewards of incentivizing principals in
the STRATEGIC treatment. The lowess curve of in-group bias in attribution is fitted at a given
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We also asked whether principals are right within identity matches? Here, we consider behavior
within counter-factual principal-agent pairs that match on the actual (for the principals) and the
expected (by the agents) reward threshold outcomes. At each level of outcome in a distinct identity
match condition, we record the principal’s correctness in attribution within identity match. Holding
fixed the outcome, this quantity measures the difference in the proportion of observations for which
the agents’ effort levels were larger than their type and the proportion of observations where prin-
cipals’ correctly attribute those outcomes to effort. Figure B.3 plots the correctness measure where
the value of 0 on the y-axes corresponds to the principals’ always correctly guessing the ordering
of type and effort for the given outcome levels. We show negative deviations (underestimation of
agents’ effort relative to type) and positive deviations (overestimation) from a correct guess.
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Figure B.3: Correctness in attribution within identity match at each level of outcome for the counter-
factually matched incentivizing principals and agents with the corresponding expectations about
in-group bias in rewards. Results are shown for agents/principals who demonstrate expected/actual
in-group bias in rewards; the unit of this analysis is groups of agents/principals who show similar
levels of (expected) in-group bias (values within the interval of 1 on the (expected) in-group bias in



















































Note, for pairs with (expected) in-group bias, the principal’s attribution choice is closer to correct
in in-group rather than out-group matches; the most systematic attribution mistakes are due to
the under-attribution to effort in the higher than average range. Relating this back to our motivat-
ing example, Bob’s interpretation of Alice’s performance tends to under-appreciate Alice’s effort.
Relating to the discussion of the two effects on agents’ choices we saw in the previous section, we
may say that principals focus on the expected bias effect, and under-appreciate the implications of
expected in-group bias in rewards on the manifestation of the expected demand effect.
Then, are principals right across identity matches? The values in the figure correspond to pairs
of incentivizing principals and agents, matching principals’ in-group bias in rewards and agents’
expectations of in-group bias. The distance from zero on the vertical axis gives a measure of
correctness of attribution across identity matches. It is computed as the difference between (1)
the average difference between attribution to effort in in-group and out-group matches at a given
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outcome and (2) the difference between the proportions of observations with effort greater than
type in in-group and out-group matches.
Figure B.4: Correctness of attribution across identity matches over in-group bias in rewards. Mark-
ers give the predicted correctness of attribution estimated from a regression of correctness of at-
tribution on (expected) in-group bias in rewards and its squared value. The dashed line gives the
lowess estimate from the raw value of correctness of attribution. The unit of analysis pairs matched
groups of agents/principals who show similar levels of (expected) in-group bias (values within the


















































The evidence in the figure reinforces our interpretation. Principals who are in-group biased in
rewards display the largest deviation from a correct guess about agents’ in-group bias in effort,
consistent with our conjecture of their failure to anticipate correctly the strength of the expected
demand effect on out-group agents.
B.3.2 Agents’ choices and beliefs
90% of agents check at least one minimal outcome they expected to be demanded by their matched
principals; the willingness to check stays constant throughout all 20 periods of the experiment. 28%
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of agents also investigate the payoff consequences of a second minimal outcome demanded and 16%
a third value. In the modal case – in 26% of the agent-rounds – agents obtain information about
payoffs for a minimally required outcome of 4, the next highest-frequency outcome value checked is
3 (22%). The distribution of checked outcomes is approximately normal, centered around 4.
Subjects in the role of an agent do not simply click through all potential outcomes. Most of them
only check outcomes from the middle of the outcome range and tend to do so only once. If agents
had clicked through all possible values of outcome, we would not be able to claim confidently they
were checking the expected outcome that is most reasonable to them, given their match. Since
agents are very specific in their expectation of the payoff information they want to obtain, and their
behavior with respect to which expected outcome they check to obtain their potential payoffs does
not change over the course of the experiment, their choices here indicate a targeted and reasoned
attempt to learn payoffs at the expected outcome threshold. In short, agents’ outcome-checking
choices appear to elicit what they believe is the outcome principals are most likely to demand in
order to reward.
Defining this measure as only the first click by an agent does not change the results of our analysis.
Figure B.5: Agents’ inquiries of payoff consequences of expected demanded minimal outcomes
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Table B.7: Agents’ effort regressed on a treatment-dummy (STRATEGIC serves as base category),
agent’s type, in-group status of the matched principal (STRATEGIC vs NON-STRATEGIC model),




treatment × type -0.34 (0.10)∗∗
in-group 0.11 (0.13)
treatment × in-group -0.10 (0.19)
type × in-group -0.03 (0.06)







Standard errors clustered by subject
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table B.8: Regression of agents’ effort on covariates for the STRATEGIC treatment. Risk-aversion
is measured by the number of safe choices made in a (Holt and Laury, 2002)-list; 4 out of 55 agents
with inconsistent choices moving through the list – switching back and forth between safe and risky
option are excluded.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
in-group 0.07 -0.33 -0.09 -1.10
(0.138) (0.308) (0.290) (0.977)
type -0.16*** -0.08 -0.07 -0.32
(0.046) (0.137) (0.144) (0.455)
expected demand 0.20** 0.29*** -0.27
(0.075) (0.083) (0.199)
expected in-group bias 0.10 -0.57
(0.215) (0.952)
type × expected demand -0.03 -0.04 0.06
(0.035) (0.036) (0.105)
expected demand × expected in-group bias -0.11** 0.16
(0.048) (0.262)
in-group × expected demand 0.17* 0.07 0.34
(0.096) (0.085) (0.264)
in-group × type -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.28
(0.059) (0.145) (0.146) (0.432)
in-group × expected in-group bias -0.17 0.46
(0.175) (0.846)
in-group × expected demand × type -0.03 -0.03 -0.10
(0.042) (0.043) (0.115)




in-group × risk aversion 0.25
(0.179)
type × risk aversion 0.06
(0.098)
expected demand × risk aversion 0.12***
(0.041)
expected in-group bias × risk aversion 0.13
(0.215)
type × expected demand × risk aversion -0.02
(0.023)
expected demand × expected in-group bias × risk aversion -0.06
(0.061)
in-group × expected demand × risk aversion -0.07
(0.048)
in-group × type × risk aversion -0.07
(0.078)
in-group × expected in-group bias × risk aversion -0.15
(0.169)
in-group × expected demand × type × risk aversion 0.02
(0.021)
in-group × expected demand × expected in-group bias × risk aversion 0.09
(0.059)
round -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 2.11*** 1.45*** 1.21*** 2.73***
(0.131) (0.258) (0.263) (0.877)
R-squared 0.033 0.152 0.180 0.240
Observations 1,020 949 949 949
Subjects 55 51 51 51
Standard errors clustered by subject
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table B.9: Marginal effects of expected demand on effort computed from a local regression
equivalent to the regression specification reported in Table B.8 on ranges of expected bias (expected
bias rounded to the nearest .5) for which we have enough observations.
Expected bias AME SE z p lower upper
-.5 0.0143 0.1911 0.0748 0.9403 -0.3602 0.3888
0 0.1945 0.0579 3.3609 0.0008 0.0811 0.3079
.5 0.2267 0.1007 2.2504 0.0244 0.0293 0.4241
1 0.0421 0.0629 0.6704 0.5026 -0.0811 0.1653
Table B.10: Marginal effects of expected bias on effort computed from a local regression equivalent
to the regression specification reported in Table B.8 on ranges of expected demand (expected demand
rounded to the nearest integer) for which we have enough observations.
Expected demand AME SE z p lower upper
2 -0.1838 0.3126 -0.5879 0.5566 -0.7964 0.4288
3 -0.0589 0.1845 -0.3191 0.7496 -0.4205 0.3028
4 0.1086 0.1997 0.5438 0.5866 -0.2829 0.5001
5 0.1453 0.1970 0.7376 0.4608 -0.2408 0.5315
6 2.4077 2.3350 1.0311 0.3025 -2.1688 6.9842
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Figure B.6: Loess smoothed curve of effort over expected demand for agents who expect in-group
bias in rewards of their matched principals plotted by in-group status.
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B.3.3 Agents’ choices and risk preferences in the STRATEGIC treatment
Agents’ choices are a comparison of a sure value (cost of investment) to an expected value of a lottery
(outcome and reward, contingent on realizations of random variables). It would be reasonable to
suppose that in making such choice, subjects will respond to the explicitly given payoffs in ways
that track their personal unmodeled risk preferences, which would induce a variation in effort choice
where our prediction of agent choices for a given type t — in particular, for the OCP equilibria —
expects no variation relative to the differences in the expected retention threshold z ∈ {3, 4, 5}.
However, we find no significant relationship between the agents’ risk preference and their expected
demand in either in- or out-group matches; the marginal effect of risk aversion on expected demand
in both is not systematically different from zero (−.01 (−.14, .11) and .07 (−.07, .20), respectively).
If agents’ risk preferences have an effect on their behavior it is on the effort choices they make, not
on their beliefs about the principals.
Indeed, we find that agents’ risk preferences importantly condition how expected demands and ex-
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pected in-group bias in principals’ reward decisions relate to effort. The marginal effect of expected
demands on effort increases systematically with agents’ risk aversion; while the marginal effect of
expected demand on effort is not significantly different from zero for risk-seeking subjects (3 safe
choices or less), they are for subjects considered risk neutral (4 safe choices) or risk averse (more
than 4 safe choices. Similarly, the expected bias effect, the marginal effect of agents’ expectation of
principals’ bias in reward decisions also grows stronger with risk aversion: the difference in marginal
effect of expected bias on effort is systematically larger in in- than out-group matches and increas-
ingly so for more risk-averse agents, while there is no such difference for more risk-accepting agents.
Marginal effects relating to the analysis of the effect of risk aversion on effort are estimated from
the regression reported in Table B.8; also see Figure B.8
A plausible, if speculative, way of understanding the behavioral motivations behind this result is by
conceiving of the agents as viewing the bonus as a reference payoff (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
and seeking to insure themselves against losing it with investment into effort (Kőszegi and Rabin,
2007). Consistent with this interpretation, when the agents anticipate higher outcome demands, the
more risk-averse among them react more strongly by investing more on the margin to meet those
demands. However, if that payoff is too distant – too risky – the insurance premium may become
too expensive to be worth purchasing, and so we should see the more risk-averse agents losing
interest in it faster. Perhaps, the status of the bonus as a reference payoff itself becomes for the
risk-averse agents less plausible when the risks associated with it become too great. Put somewhat
differently, those agents for whom the gap between in-group and out-group expectations is high tend
to regard the bonus in the out-group matches as a particularly distant prospect, accounting for the
relationship we reported above. If this interpretation is right, the patterns reported should be most
pronounced when agents have lower types. Indeed, that is the case: the effect of risk preference on
the expected demand effect and on the expected bias effect is highest for type 1 agents. See Figure
B.7.
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Figure B.7: Marginal effect of expected demands on effort (= expected demand effect, Panel A)
and difference in marginal effect of expected in-group bias on effort (= difference in expected bias
effect, Panel B) over risk-aversion (number of safe choices in the Holt and Laury (2002)-list) by
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Figure B.8: Marginal effect of expected demands on effort (= expected demand effect, Panel A)
as well as marginal effect (= expected bias effect, Panel B) by in-group status plotted over risk-
aversion. We also show the difference in marginal effect of expected in-group bias on effort (Panel












































































































B.3.4 Average treatment effects: NON-STRATEGIC treatment
Table B.11: Logistic regression of attribution decision on indicators of treatment status, being
classified as non-incentivizing principals, in-group status, and high (good) outcome as well as the
interactions of those variables and round of play. For non-incentivizing principals and principals
in the NON-STRATEGIC treatment, high outcomes are defined as those that are above > 4, in
contrast to low outcomes (< 4. For incentivizing principals, good outcomes are defined as those








non-incentivizing × in-group 0.89*
(0.516)
NON-STRATEGIC × in-group 1.40*
(0.740)
high (good) outcome -0.66**
(0.298)
non-incentivizing × high (good) outcome 1.69***
(0.629)
NON-STRATEGIC × high (good) outcome -1.16*
(0.659)
in-group × high (good) outcome 0.85***
(0.294)
non-incentivizing × in-group × high (good) outcome -1.95**
(0.819)







Standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
B.3.5 History of play
Principals’ reward and attribution decisions As expected, with increasing number of rounds
played, the threshold in the outcome space above which incentivizing principals are willing to reward
the agent improves with respect to minimizing committed categorization errors. Figure B.9 shows
a decrease in the spread of the probability of errors associated with the error minimizing threshold
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computed for each principal (while the mean remains constant); in other words, the computation of
principals’ thresholds becomes more precise with round of play. There is an element of noise we seem
unable to pick up with our definition of each individual principals’ threshold; the categorization error
associated with the threshold that minimizes errors lingers around a probability of .2 of committing
a categorization error.
Figure B.9: Distribution of the probability of an error in categorizing reward decisions associated
with the principal’s reward threshold (= error minimizing threshold above which incentivizing prin-
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Minimum probability of errors
Looking at principals reward decisions in the aggregate, we do not find a relationship of experience of
favourable treatment in general and in in-group and out-group in particular; we express favourable
past experience in current round t as the average outcome in round 1 to t − 1. Table B.12 shows
no significant effect of experience on current reward choices; here we model reward decisions as
a function of outcome, favourable past experience (overall and separated by in- and out-group),
the in-group status of the matched agent (applicable in the comparison STRATEGIC and NON-
STRATEGIC treatment), the interaction of those variables, and round of play.
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Table B.12: Logistic regression of principals’ reward decisions on outcome on average of past out-






outcomes in the past in the in-group 0.19
(0.308)




in-group ×outcomes in the past in the in-group 0.06
(0.275)





Standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Modeling the attribution decisions of incentivizing principals as a function of outcome, the in-group
status of the matched agent, and, similar to above, past outcome experience, shows that there is
also no effect of a history of favourable experience with any agent, in-group agents, or out-group
agents on the decision whether to attribute outcomes to effort. For our argument of the existence
of strategic discrimination, behavior among incentivizing principals in the STRATEGIC treatment,
because they accept to act in a strategic environment, and comparing those to principals in the
NON-STRATEGIC treatment is the relevant counterfactual; Model (2) and (4) in Table B.13 gives
the regression results for this comparison.
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Table B.13: Logistic regression of principals’ attribution decisions on outcome, in-group status of
the matched principal, average of past outcomes in STRATEGIC, NON-STRATEGIC treatment,
where the treatment-variable takes the STRATEGIC treatment as its base category, and in the
STRATEGIC treatment on average of past outcomes in the in- and out-group separately; standard
errors are computed based on clustering by subject. Model (2) and (4) exclude non-incentivizing
principals in the STRATEGIC treatment from the analysis.
STRATEGIC and
All NON-STRATEGIC
VARIABLES treatments (1) (2) (3) (4)
NON-STRATEGIC -0.61 1.37 1.38 0.83 0.69
(1.612) (2.923) (2.978) (2.455) (2.503)
outcome -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 -0.02 -0.10
(0.071) (0.082) (0.091) (0.085) (0.104)
outcomes in the past 0.01 -0.01 0.06
(0.200) (0.231) (0.232)
in-group -0.16 -1.41 0.87 -0.36
(1.218) (1.084) (1.208) (1.319)
outcomes in the past in the in-group -0.02 -0.12
(0.251) (0.278)
outcomes in the past in the out-group 0.11 0.23
(0.156) (0.137)
in-group ×outcome 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.13
(0.112) (0.124) (0.110) (0.128)
in-group ×outcomes in the past 0.04 0.27
(0.297) (0.267)
in-group ×outcomes in the past in the in-group -0.06 0.02
(0.223) (0.253)
in-group ×outcomes in the past in the out-group -0.21 -0.08
(0.187) (0.225)
NON-STRATEGIC ×outcome -0.46** -0.44** -0.36* -0.54** -0.46**
(0.193) (0.197) (0.201) (0.224) (0.232)
NON-STRATEGIC ×outcomes in the past 0.70* 0.16 0.08
(0.365) (0.599) (0.605)
NON-STRATEGIC ×in-group -4.25 -3.04 -3.12 -1.93
(4.072) (4.060) (4.126) (4.192)
NON-STRATEGIC ×outcomes in the past in the in-group 0.42 0.52
(0.485) (0.501)
NON-STRATEGIC ×outcomes in the past in the out-group -0.03 -0.15
(0.317) (0.309)
NON-STRATEGIC ×in-group ×outcome -0.07 -0.15 -0.09 -0.18
(0.251) (0.257) (0.230) (0.239)
NON-STRATEGIC ×in-group ×outcomes in the past 1.18 0.97
(0.899) (0.896)
NON-STRATEGIC ×in-group ×outcomes in the past in the in-group -0.25 -0.32
(0.695) (0.709)
NON-STRATEGIC ×in-group ×outcomes in the past in the out-group 1.18* 1.05
(0.640) (0.658)
round -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02 -0.02
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016)
Constant 0.38 0.47 0.51 0.06 0.25
(0.881) (0.953) (1.044) (1.198) (1.299)
Standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses
Observations 1,995 1,634 1,330 1,412 1,161
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Learning, in the shape of forming beliefs about agents’ behavior given past experience with agents’
performance (outcomes), does not exist once experience with in-group vs out-group agents is intro-
duced into the model (Model 5 and 6).
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We do find that our result of an attribution bias for good outcomes by incentivizing principals in
the STRATEGIC treatment fully emerges in the second half (round 11 to 20) of the experiment
only. Figure B.10 and B.11 replicate Figure 2 from the main text and shows that the observed
attribution bias for good outcomes by incentivizing principals exists in direction in the first half but
is significantly different from zero only in the second half of the experiment.
Figure B.10: In-group bias in attribution to effort by outcome and treatment in the first half of




































Bad outcome Good outcome
NON−STRATEGIC
Figure B.11: In-group bias in attribution to effort by outcome and treatment in the second half of
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Agents’ effort decisions and expected demand beliefs Elaborating on the effect of history
of play on agents, we see that agents’ beliefs do not respond to individual agents’ experience with
reward decisions of their matched principals. Table B.15 shows no significant effect of the past rate
of being rewarded overall, in in-group, or in out-group matches on agents’ current expectations of
principals’ demands. There is, however, an effect of favourable treatment as out-group agent in
the past in terms of principals’ reward decisions on agent’s current effort choice in the Strategic
treatment (Table B.14). In particular, in the STRATEGIC treatment, the marginal effect of an
increase in the rate of reward in the in-group in past rounds raises effort of agents in in-group
matches by .46 (.12, .81). A rise in receiving a reward in the out-group increases effort in in-group
matches (.41 (.02, .80)) and out-group matches (.44 (.03, .86)); marginal effects are estimated from
Model (2) in Table B.14). Given that this relationship seems not to be related to a positively
updated belief about the likelihood of receiving a reward from principals in the current round, we
do not think that this finding takes away from our interpretation of strategic discrimination.
We also do not see different patterns emerging with respect to expected demand and expected bias
effect as reported in Figure 3 in the main text (See Figure B.12 and B.13.)
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Table B.14: Regression of agents’ effort on type, rate rewarded in the past in the in- and out-group




rewarded in the past 0.32
(0.257)




rewarded in the past in the in-group 0.02
(0.215)
rewarded in the past in the out-group 0.41**
(0.199)
in-group × type -0.06 -0.08
(0.057) (0.060)
in-group × rewarded in the past 0.20
(0.233)
in-group × expected demand 0.07 0.05
(0.058) (0.052)
in-group × rewarded in the past in the in-group 0.45**
(0.204)








Standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.15: Regression of agents’ effort on type, rate rewarded in the past in the in- and out-group
separately, and in-group status of the matched principal in the STRATEGIC treatment; standard








rewarded in the past in the in-group 0.74
(0.481)
rewarded in the past in the out-group 0.01
(0.411)








Standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure B.12: Predicted levels of effort plotted over expected in-group bias and expected demands for
in-group matches (Panel A) and out-group matches (Panel B) in the first half of the experiment





























Figure B.13: Predicted levels of effort plotted over expected in-group bias and expected demands for
in-group matches (Panel A) and out-group matches (Panel B) in the second half of the experiment





























Incentivizing principals constitute 58% of the principals in the NON-IDENTITY treatment. Prin-
cipals’ reward decisions are significantly increasing in outcome. The marginal effect of outcome on
awarding a bonus s .06 (.01, .12)) The average principal-specific outcome threshold is 4.45. Incen-
tivizing principals in the NON-IDENTITY treatment do not attribute to effort differently upon
observing good and bad outcomes. The average share of reward decisions incorrectly classified
by the error-minimizing threshold is .13 suggesting that principals’ reward decisions are largely
consistent with their inferred individual thresholds.
B.5 Testing the power of incentives across strategic and non-strategic treat-
ments
We compare the marginal effect of agents’ type on their effort in STRATEGIC and NON-IDENTITY
treatment as well as in NON-STRATEGIC and NON-STRATEGIC/NON-IDENTITY treatment.
The marginal effect of type on effort for agents is −.28 (−.44,−.13) in the NON-IDENTITY treat-
ment, −.18 (−.25,−.10) in the STRATEGIC treatment, −.52 (−.70,−.34) in the NON-STRATEGIC
treatment, and −.69 (−.84,−.54) in the NON-STRATEGIC/NON-IDENTITY treatment. Com-
paring the first two numbers, we observe that as the agent type increases, the effort decreases, as
predicted by our theoretical analysis. The similar conclusion holds for the second set of numbers.
The effect of identity appears to be to slightly muffle the marginal effects, but the decrease is not
statistically significant.
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Note, threshold values in the figure are rounded up to
nearest integer and there were no thresholds at 4 in
the NON-IDENTITY treatment.
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